Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions.

Anbarci, N.; Sun, C.

Abstract

Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and Discrete Raiffa solutions. We show that the “robustness of intermediate agreements” plus additional well-known and plausible axioms, provide novel axiomatizations of the above-mentioned solutions. Hence, we provide a unified framework for comparing these solutionsʼ bargaining theories.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Sun, C. (2013). Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1), 367-376. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.001

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Nov 9, 2012
• Publication Date: 2013-01
• Deposit Date: Aug 17, 2018
• Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
• Print ISSN: 0899-8256
• Electronic ISSN: 1090-2473
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 77
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 367-376
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.001
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1317155