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Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions.

Anbarci, N.; Sun, C.

Authors

C. Sun



Abstract

Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and Discrete Raiffa solutions. We show that the “robustness of intermediate agreements” plus additional well-known and plausible axioms, provide novel axiomatizations of the above-mentioned solutions. Hence, we provide a unified framework for comparing these solutionsʼ bargaining theories.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Sun, C. (2013). Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1), 367-376. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.001

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Nov 9, 2012
Publication Date 2013-01
Deposit Date Aug 17, 2018
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 77
Issue 1
Pages 367-376
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.001
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1317155