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Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.

Anbarci, N.; Boyd, J.H.

Authors

J.H. Boyd



Abstract

We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. In one, as in all past variants of Nash demand games, the Nash bargaining solution is the equilibrium outcome. The other demand game allows for probabilistic continuation in cases of infeasible joint demands. Specifically, with probability the game terminates and the players receive their disagreement payoffs; but with probability p the game continues to a second stage in which one of the two incompatible demands is randomly selected and implemented. Surprisingly, the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution is always the outcome of the most robust equilibrium of this game. Moreover, ranking other solution concepts is impossible.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Boyd, J. (2011). Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Games and Economic Behavior, 71(1), 14-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.009

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Aug 5, 2010
Publication Date 2011-01
Deposit Date Aug 17, 2018
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 71
Issue 1
Pages 14-22
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.009
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1317123