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Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy

Anbarci, N.



In both the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and employee buyouts, the common and crucial phenomenon is that some workers have two sources of income, namely wages and shares of profit. We analyze that phenomenon in an economy where workers are nonunionized and wages are determined by voting. If the employers sell a certain amount of shares of the capital stock to some non-risk-loving workers, these workers vote for the lowest possible wage along with the employers. As a result, all workers become equally worse off because of the competition among workers to buy those shares.


Anbarci, N. (1993). Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 20(3), 319-330.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 1993-04
Deposit Date Aug 17, 2018
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Print ISSN 0167-2681
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 20
Issue 3
Pages 319-330
Public URL