Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy

Anbarci, N.

Abstract

In both the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and employee buyouts, the common and crucial phenomenon is that some workers have two sources of income, namely wages and shares of profit. We analyze that phenomenon in an economy where workers are nonunionized and wages are determined by voting. If the employers sell a certain amount of shares of the capital stock to some non-risk-loving workers, these workers vote for the lowest possible wage along with the employers. As a result, all workers become equally worse off because of the competition among workers to buy those shares.

Citation

Anbarci, N. (1993). Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 20(3), 319-330. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681%2893%2990029-o

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 1993-04
• Deposit Date: Aug 17, 2018
• Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
• Print ISSN: 0167-2681
• Electronic ISSN: 2328-7616
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 319-330
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681%2893%2990029-o
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1317025