The Value of Practical Knowledge: Against Engstrom’s Constructivism

Saunders, Joe

Abstract

Stephen Engstrom has recently offered an excellent account of morality as practical cognition. He emphasizes the formal conditions of practical knowledge, which he finds in Kant. Engstrom also aligns his account with constructivism, claiming that value is constructed through these formal conditions, chiefly universalisability. In this paper, I employ a variant of Hegel’s empty-formalism objection to challenge the moral significance of the mere form of practical knowledge. I hope to show that Engstrom’s constructivism is neither philosophically compelling, nor required by the rest of his position. In its place, I propose a realist understanding of the value of practical knowledge.

Citation

Saunders, J. (2016). The Value of Practical Knowledge: Against Engstrom’s Constructivism. Hegel Bulletin, 37(01), 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.6

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Apr 4, 2016
• Publication Date: 2016-05
• Deposit Date: Oct 16, 2018
• Journal: Hegel Bulletin
• Print ISSN: 2051-5367
• Electronic ISSN: 2051-5375
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 37
• Issue: 01
• Pages: 117-136
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.6
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1316033