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Anne Conway as a Priority Monist: A Reply to Gordon-Roth

Thomas, Emily

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Abstract

For early modern metaphysician Anne Conway, the world comprises creatures. In some sense, Conway is a monist about creatures: all creatures are one. Yet, as Jessica Gordon-Roth (2018) has astutely pointed out, that monism can be understood in very different ways. One might read Conway as an ‘existence pluralist’: creatures are all composed of the same type of substance, but many substances exist. Alternatively, one might read Conway as an ‘existence monist’: there is only one created substance. Gordon-Roth has done the scholarship a great favor by illuminating these issues in Conway. However, this article takes issue with Gordon-Roth's further view that Conway ‘oscillates’ between the extremes of existence pluralism and monism. In its place, I argue we should read Conway as a priority monist: the whole of creation is ontologically prior to its parts.

Citation

Thomas, E. (2020). Anne Conway as a Priority Monist: A Reply to Gordon-Roth. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(3), 275-284. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.1

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 4, 2019
Online Publication Date Jan 20, 2020
Publication Date 2020
Deposit Date Jan 4, 2019
Publicly Available Date Feb 1, 2019
Journal Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Print ISSN 2053-4477
Electronic ISSN 2053-4485
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 6
Issue 3
Pages 275-284
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.1
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1310895

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Copyright Statement
This article will be published in a revised form in Journal of the American Philosophical Association. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © American Philosophical Association 2018.






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