Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?

Cowie, Christopher

Abstract

In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to knowledge. I develop this explanation. I then present a challenge to it. Norm-based explanations of Moore’s Paradox must appeal to a ‘linking principle’ that explains what is wrong with violating the constitutive norm. But it is difficult to articulate a plausible candidate linking-principle. I show this by canvassing the obvious candidates and articulating the problems with each.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2020). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies, 177(6), 1685-1702. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 6, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Mar 25, 2019
• Publication Date: Jun 30, 2020
• Deposit Date: Mar 6, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 5, 2019
• Journal: Philosophical studies
• Print ISSN: 0031-8116
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-0883
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 177
• Issue: 6
• Pages: 1685-1702
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1301688