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The role of corporate political strategies in M&As

Croci, Ettore; Pantzalis, Christos; Park, Jung Chul; Petmezas, Dimitris

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Ettore Croci

Christos Pantzalis

Jung Chul Park


In line with the view that politics can complicate M&A deals, we find that firms contributing to political action committees or involved in lobbying are less likely to be acquired and their takeover process is lengthier. As we empirically show, this can be explained by the fact that politicians have motives to interfere with the takeover process due to career concerns, in terms of getting re-elected and raising funds for future campaigns. We also document that politically connected target firms command higher takeover premiums from bidders lacking political expertise, consistent with the notion that the market regards target firms' connections, not easily replicable by bidders, as means to enhance growth opportunities of the merged firm.


Croci, E., Pantzalis, C., Park, J. C., & Petmezas, D. (2017). The role of corporate political strategies in M&As. Journal of Corporate Finance, 43, 260-287.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 23, 2017
Online Publication Date Jan 27, 2017
Publication Date 2017-04
Deposit Date Jul 29, 2020
Publicly Available Date Jul 29, 2020
Journal Journal of Corporate Finance
Print ISSN 0929-1199
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 43
Pages 260-287
Public URL
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