Investors Activism and the Gains from Takeover Deals

Guo, M; Paudyal, K; Utham, V; Xing, X

Abstract

We examine whether activists add value to the shareholders of targets and their acquirers. Several findings emerge. First, acquirers of targets that have activists outperform acquirers of other targets in both the short and long term. Second, the premium received by the shareholders of targets is not affected by activism. Third, superior gains achieved by the acquirers of targets with activists are driven by non-cash deals, while the average target benefits more from cash deals.

Citation

Guo, M., Paudyal, K., Utham, V., & Xing, X. (2020). Investors Activism and the Gains from Takeover Deals. European Journal of Finance, 26(1), 64-83. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847x.2019.1680407

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Oct 8, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Oct 23, 2019
• Publication Date: 2020
• Deposit Date: Oct 9, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 23, 2021
• Journal: European Journal of Finance
• Print ISSN: 1351-847X
• Electronic ISSN: 1466-4364
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 64-83
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847x.2019.1680407
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1288746