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CEO turnover in large banks: Does tail risk matter?

Srivastav, Abhishek; Keasey, Kevin; Mollah, Sabur; Vallascas, Francesco

CEO turnover in large banks: Does tail risk matter? Thumbnail


Abhishek Srivastav

Kevin Keasey

Sabur Mollah


In a cross-country setting we show the probability of a forced CEO turnover in large banks is positively associated with idiosyncratic tail risk. This finding is strengthened the greater the competition in the banking industry and when stakeholders have more to lose in the case of distress. Overall, the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk offers valuable signals to bank boards on the quality of the choices made by CEOs. In contrast, systematic tail risk becomes important for forced CEO turnovers only in the presence of a major variation in the costs this risk generates for shareholders and the organization.


Srivastav, A., Keasey, K., Mollah, S., & Vallascas, F. (2017). CEO turnover in large banks: Does tail risk matter?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 64(1), 37-55.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 15, 2017
Online Publication Date May 19, 2017
Publication Date 2017-08
Deposit Date Jul 28, 2020
Publicly Available Date Jul 28, 2020
Journal Journal of Accounting and Economics
Print ISSN 0165-4101
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 64
Issue 1
Pages 37-55
Public URL
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