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Governance mandates, outside directors, and acquirer performance

Dahya, Jay; Golubov, Andrey; Petmezas, Dimitris; Travlos, Nickolaos G.

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Jay Dahya

Andrey Golubov

Nickolaos G. Travlos


We use hand-collected board data around the issuance of two distinct government-led board structure mandates in the U.K. to establish the effect of outside directors on acquirer performance. Increases in outside director representation are associated with better acquirer returns in deals involving listed targets, but not when the target is private. These results are consistent with greater outside director reputational exposure when publicity is high. While we do not advocate mandated board structures, our evidence suggests that the particular diktats we examine were associated with improved acquirer performance in public firm takeovers. We present corroborating evidence from the U.S. around a similar reform period.


Dahya, J., Golubov, A., Petmezas, D., & Travlos, N. G. (2019). Governance mandates, outside directors, and acquirer performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 59, 218-238.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Nov 7, 2016
Online Publication Date Nov 18, 2016
Publication Date 2019-12
Deposit Date Jul 29, 2020
Publicly Available Date Jul 29, 2020
Journal Journal of Corporate Finance
Print ISSN 0929-1199
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 59
Pages 218-238
Public URL
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