Ettore Croci
Asymmetric Information and Target Firm Returns
Croci, Ettore; Petmezas, Dimitris; Travlos, Nickolaos
Abstract
This article examines the relationship between asymmetric information and target firm returns in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We argue that if managers possess favourable (unfavourable) asymmetric information, they will offer, ceteris paribus, a high (low) premium, affecting target firm returns accordingly. We propose several proxies of asymmetric information. The empirical evidence strongly supports our hypothesis as we find that target firm returns are significantly negatively related to asymmetric information regarding synergy gains. Our results are robust after controlling for several target and deal characteristics.
Citation
Croci, E., Petmezas, D., & Travlos, N. (2012). Asymmetric Information and Target Firm Returns. European Journal of Finance, 18(7), 639-661. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847x.2011.599850
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Jun 20, 2011 |
Online Publication Date | Sep 19, 2011 |
Publication Date | 2012 |
Deposit Date | Aug 2, 2020 |
Journal | European Journal of Finance |
Print ISSN | 1351-847X |
Electronic ISSN | 1466-4364 |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis Group |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 7 |
Pages | 639-661 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847x.2011.599850 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1264779 |
You might also like
Societal Equality Sentiment and Executive Compensation
(2022)
Journal Article
The Effects of Terrorist Attacks on Inventor Productivity and Mobility
(2022)
Journal Article
Agency Costs of Debt and Inside Debt: The Role of CEO Overconfidence
(2022)
Journal Article
Does Terrorism Affect Acquisitions?
(2022)
Journal Article
Credit Ratings and Acquisitions
(2021)
Journal Article
Downloadable Citations
About Durham Research Online (DRO)
Administrator e-mail: dro.admin@durham.ac.uk
This application uses the following open-source libraries:
SheetJS Community Edition
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
PDF.js
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
Font Awesome
SIL OFL 1.1 (http://scripts.sil.org/OFL)
MIT License (http://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html)
CC BY 3.0 ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Powered by Worktribe © 2024
Advanced Search