A new argument for moral error theory

Cowie, Christopher

Abstract

Traditional arguments for moral error theory are based on identifying a problem with the metaphysics of moral properties. I provide a new argument that is based on the inconsistency of first‐order moral judgments. I illustrate this using impossibility results in population axiology.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2022). A new argument for moral error theory. Noûs, 56(2), 276-294. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Oct 20, 2020
• Publication Date: 2022-06
• Deposit Date: Oct 21, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 20, 2022
• Journal: Noûs
• Print ISSN: 0029-4624
• Electronic ISSN: 1468-0068
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 56
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 276-294
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1259245