Fictional Modality and the Intensionality of Fictional Contexts

Uckelman, Sara L.

Abstract

In [4], Kosterec claims to provide "model-theoretic proofs" of certain theses involving the normal modal operators and and the truth-in- ction (a la Lewis) operator F which he then goes on to show have coun- terexamples in Kripke models. He concludes from this that the embedding of normal modal logic under the truth-in-ction operator is unsound. We show instead that it is the \model-theoretic proofs" that are themselves unsound, involving illicit substitution, a subtle error that nevertheless al- lows us to draw an important conclusion about intensional contexts (such as ctional contexts) and semantic equivalences. [[4] Milos Kosterec. On modality in ction. Synthese, 199:13543-13567, 2021.]

Citation

Uckelman, S. L. (2022). Fictional Modality and the Intensionality of Fictional Contexts. Australasian journal of logic, 19(4), 124-132. https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v19i4.7542

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jun 8, 2022
• Online Publication Date: Sep 22, 2022
• Publication Date: 2022
• Deposit Date: Jun 14, 2022
• Publicly Available Date: Dec 5, 2022
• Journal: The Australasian Journal of Logic
• Electronic ISSN: 1448-5052
• Publisher: Australasian Association of Logic and Victoria University of Wellington
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 4
• Article Number: 1
• Pages: 124-132
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v19i4.7542
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1204109