Suffering and the Primacy of Virtue

James, Simon P.

Abstract

Some people claim that some instances of suffering are intrinsically bad in an impersonal way. If it were true, that claim might seem to count against virtue ethics and for consequentialism. Drawing on the works of Jason Kawall, Christine Swanton and Nietzsche, I consider some reasons for thinking that it is, however, false. I argue, moreover, that even if it were true, a virtue ethicist could consistently acknowledge its truth.

Citation

James, S. P. (2019). Suffering and the Primacy of Virtue. Analysis, 79(4), 605-613. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz049

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 28, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Sep 16, 2019
• Publication Date: Oct 30, 2019
• Deposit Date: Jun 19, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 16, 2020
• Journal: Analysis
• Print ISSN: 0003-2638
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-8284
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 79
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 605-613
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz049
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1299070