Negative Implications of Greater Access to the Courts in the Takeover Process

Mukwiri, Jonathan

Abstract

Recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union involving Austria and Italy raises the question of whether greater access to the courts makes ineffective the duty of supervisory authorities in enforcing the mandatory bid rule. This question is discussed in the context of provisions in the Takeover Bid Directive that enables Member States to avoid disruptive greater access to the courts. The overarching argument advanced in this article is that a system of takeover regulation that provides parties the ability to challenge regulatory decisions in courts is bound to cause delays and uncertainty in the takeover process. In the UK, the Takeover Bid Directive was implemented in a way that limits greater access to the courts for parties that are required to comply with the ruling of the supervisory authority. The article suggest that the UK approach may provide a benchmark for reform in EU countries.

Citation

Mukwiri, J. (2023). Negative Implications of Greater Access to the Courts in the Takeover Process. European Company and Financial Law Review, 20(2), 358-384. https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2023-0018

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jun 1, 2023
• Online Publication Date: Sep 26, 2023
• Publication Date: 2023
• Deposit Date: Jun 30, 2023
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 27, 2024
• Journal: European Company and Financial Law Review
• Print ISSN: 1613-2548
• Electronic ISSN: 1613-2556
• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 358-384
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2023-0018
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1170041
• Publisher URL: https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ecfr/html