F. Massacci
FuturesMEX: Secure Distributed Futures Market Exchange
Massacci, F.; Ngo, C.N.; Nie, J.; Venturi, D.; Williams, J.
Authors
C.N. Ngo
J. Nie
D. Venturi
Professor Julian Williams julian.williams@durham.ac.uk
Head of Department
Abstract
In a Futures-Exchange, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, traders buy and sell contractual promises (futures) to acquire or deliver, at some future pre-specified date, assets ranging from wheat to crude oil and from bacon to cash in a desired currency. The interactions between economic and security properties and the exchange’s essentially non-monotonic security behavior; a valid trader’s valid action can invalidate other traders’ previously valid positions, are a challenge for security research. We show the security properties that guarantee an Exchange’s economic viability (availability of trading information, liquidity, confidentiality of positions, absence of price discrimination, risk-management) and an attack when traders’ anonymity is broken. We describe all key operations for a secure, fully distributed Futures-Exchange, hereafter referred to as simply the ‘Exchange’. Our distributed, asynchronous protocol simulates the centralized functionality under the assumptions of anonymity of the physical layer and availability of a distributed ledger. We consider security with abort (in absence of honest majority) and extend it to penalties. Our proof of concept implementation and its optimization (based on zk-SNARKs and SPDZ) demonstrate that the computation of actual trading days (along Thomson-Reuters Tick History DB) is feasible for low-frequency markets; however, more research is needed for high-frequency ones.
Citation
Massacci, F., Ngo, C., Nie, J., Venturi, D., & Williams, J. (2018, May). FuturesMEX: Secure Distributed Futures Market Exchange. Presented at 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)., San Francisco, CA, USA
Presentation Conference Type | Conference Paper (published) |
---|---|
Conference Name | 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). |
Start Date | May 20, 2018 |
End Date | May 24, 2018 |
Acceptance Date | Feb 1, 2018 |
Online Publication Date | Jul 26, 2018 |
Publication Date | 2018 |
Deposit Date | Feb 15, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Feb 15, 2018 |
Pages | 335-353 |
Series ISSN | 2375-1207 |
Book Title | 2018 IEEE symposium on security and privacy SP 2018. |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.00028 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1147202 |
Publisher URL | https://www.ieee.org/conferences_events/conferences/conferencedetails/index.html?Conf_ID=37862 |
Files
Accepted Conference Proceeding
(486 Kb)
PDF
Copyright Statement
© 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
You might also like
JUNE: open-source individual-based epidemiology simulation
(2021)
Journal Article
The Work-Averse Cyber Attacker Model: Theory and Evidence From Two Million Attack Signatures
(2021)
Journal Article
Testing the Eigenvalue Structure of Spot and Integrated Covariance
(2021)
Journal Article
Downloadable Citations
About Durham Research Online (DRO)
Administrator e-mail: dro.admin@durham.ac.uk
This application uses the following open-source libraries:
SheetJS Community Edition
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
PDF.js
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
Font Awesome
SIL OFL 1.1 (http://scripts.sil.org/OFL)
MIT License (http://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html)
CC BY 3.0 ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Powered by Worktribe © 2025
Advanced Search