Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value
(2019)
Journal Article
Hof, F., Kern, W., Kurz, S., Pashkovich, K., & Paulusma, D. (2020). Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value. Social Choice and Welfare, 54(4), 609-621. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01221-6
A simple game (N; v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of losing coalitions L with value v(L) = 0 that is closed under taking subsets and a set W of winning coalitions W with value v(W) = 1. We let = minp>0;p6=0 maxW... Read More about Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value.