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All Outputs (38)

The aesthetics of sport and the arts: competing and complementary (2018)
Journal Article
Mumford, S. (2019). The aesthetics of sport and the arts: competing and complementary. Sport in Society, 5, 723-733. https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2018.1430478

Sport has a distinctive aesthetic that derives from its ontological basis in competition, indeterminism and emergence. The aim in sport is to compete, rather than the production of aesthetic value. An effective way to secure the latter, however, is p... Read More about The aesthetics of sport and the arts: competing and complementary.

Evidence based on what? (2015)
Journal Article
Anjum, R., Kerry, R., & Mumford, S. (2015). Evidence based on what?. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 21(6), E11-E12

Freedom and Control: on the Modality of Free Will (2015)
Journal Article
Mumford, S., & Anjum, R. L. (2015). Freedom and Control: on the Modality of Free Will. American Philosophical Quarterly, 52(1), 1-11

Free will is a problem of modality, hampered by a commitment to modal dualism: the view that there is only necessity and pure contingency. If we have necessity, then things couldn't have been otherwise, against the Principle of Alternate Possibilitie... Read More about Freedom and Control: on the Modality of Free Will.

Powers, Non-consent and Freedom (2014)
Journal Article
Mumford, S., & Anjum, R. L. (2015). Powers, Non-consent and Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1), 136-152. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12112

There are a number of dispositionalist solutions to the free will problem based on freedom consisting in the agent's exercise of a power. But if a subject a is free when they exercise their power P, there is an objection to be overcome from the possi... Read More about Powers, Non-consent and Freedom.

A new argument against compatibilism (2013)
Journal Article
Mumford, S., & Anjum, R. L. (2014). A new argument against compatibilism. Analysis, 74(1), 20-25. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant095

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced: 1. If causal determinism is... Read More about A new argument against compatibilism.