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All Outputs (27)

The Mental Causation Debate and Qua Problems (2017)
Book Chapter
Gibb, S. (2017). The Mental Causation Debate and Qua Problems. In M. Paoletti, & F. Orilia (Eds.), Philosophical and scientific perspectives on downward causation (265-277). Routledge

Physical Determinability (2015)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2015). Physical Determinability. Humana.mente, 29, 69-90

I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure... Read More about Physical Determinability.

Tropes and the Generality of Laws (2015)
Book Chapter
Gibb, S. (2015). Tropes and the Generality of Laws. In G. Galluzzo, & M. Loux (Eds.), The problem of universals in contemporary philosophy (156-172). Cambridge University Press

The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization (2013)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2014). The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(3), 551-566. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.857701

Proponents of the subset account of property realization commonly make the assumption that the summing of properties entails the summing of their forward-looking causal features. This paper seeks to establish that this assumption is false. Moreover,... Read More about The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization.

Mental Causation and Ontology (2013)
Book
Gibb, S., Lowe, E., & Ingthorsson, R. (Eds.). (2013). Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press

Mental Causation and Double Prevention (2013)
Book Chapter
Gibb, S. (2013). Mental Causation and Double Prevention. In S. Gibb, E. Lowe, & R. Ingthorsson (Eds.), Mental causation and ontology (193-214). Oxford University Press

Introduction (2013)
Book Chapter
Gibb, S. (2013). Introduction. In S. Gibb, E. Lowe, & R. Ingthorsson (Eds.), Mental causation and ontology (1-17). Oxford University Press

The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers (2013)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2014). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers. Erkenntnis, 79(1), 127-146. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9481-0

According to one popular criterion of property identity, where X and Y are properties, X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y bestow the same conditional powers on their bearers. In this paper, I argue that this causal criterion of property ide... Read More about The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers.

Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure (2012)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2012). Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure. American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(1), 29-42

Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments for physicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This pri... Read More about Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure.

Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. (2010)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2010). Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. Dialectica, 64(3), 363-384. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01237.x

The conservation laws do not establish the central premise within the argument from causal overdetermination – the causal completeness of the physical domain. Contrary to David Papineau (2000 and 2002), this is true even if there is no non-physical e... Read More about Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum..

Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion (2009)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenntnis, 71(2), 205-221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9150-x

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle conce... Read More about Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion.