All Outputs (17)

Physical Determinability (2015)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2015). Physical Determinability. Humana.mente, 29, 69-90

I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure... Read More about Physical Determinability.

VIII—Defending Dualism (2015)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2015). VIII—Defending Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115(2pt2), 131-146. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x

In the contemporary mental causation debate, two dualist models of psychophysical causal relevance have been proposed which entail that although mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain, this is not in virtue of them causing any phy... Read More about VIII—Defending Dualism.

The Causal Closure Principle (2015)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2015). The Causal Closure Principle. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261), 626-647. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv030

In the mental causation debate, there is a common assumption that interactive dualism is false because of the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. However, this paper argues that recent advances in metaphysics—more specifically, in... Read More about The Causal Closure Principle.

Mental Causation (2014)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2014). Mental Causation. Analysis, 74(2), 327-338. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant117

How could mental entities causally affect, or be affected by, physical entities? Identifying a relationship between mental and physical entities that is both consistent with their causal interaction and independently plausible is one of the perennial... Read More about Mental Causation.

The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization (2013)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2014). The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(3), 551-566. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.857701

Proponents of the subset account of property realization commonly make the assumption that the summing of properties entails the summing of their forward-looking causal features. This paper seeks to establish that this assumption is false. Moreover,... Read More about The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization.

The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers (2013)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2014). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers. Erkenntnis, 79(1), 127-146. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9481-0

According to one popular criterion of property identity, where X and Y are properties, X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y bestow the same conditional powers on their bearers. In this paper, I argue that this causal criterion of property ide... Read More about The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers.

'Tropes: Objects, Properties and Mental Causation' by D. Ehring (2012)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2012). 'Tropes: Objects, Properties and Mental Causation' by D. Ehring. Analysis, 72(4), 850-851. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans099

Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure (2012)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2012). Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure. American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(1), 29-42

Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments for physicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This pri... Read More about Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure.

Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. (2010)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2010). Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. Dialectica, 64(3), 363-384. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01237.x

The conservation laws do not establish the central premise within the argument from causal overdetermination – the causal completeness of the physical domain. Contrary to David Papineau (2000 and 2002), this is true even if there is no non-physical e... Read More about Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum..

Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion (2009)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenntnis, 71(2), 205-221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9150-x

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle conce... Read More about Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion.

'The Mind in Nature' by C. B. Martin (2009)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2009). 'The Mind in Nature' by C. B. Martin. Analysis, 69(2), 386-388. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp023

'Physical Realization' by Sydney Shoemaker (2009)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2009). 'Physical Realization' by Sydney Shoemaker. Mind, 118(469), 207-211. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp010

Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent? (2007)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2007). Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent?. Dialectica, 61(4), 539-558 (Awarded the Dialectica Annual Essay Prize). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01121.x

Why Davidson is not a Property Epiphenomenalist (2006)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2006). Why Davidson is not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 14(3), 407-422. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550600858346

Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entai... Read More about Why Davidson is not a Property Epiphenomenalist.

Space, Supervenience and Entailment (2006)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2006). Space, Supervenience and Entailment. Philosophical Papers, 35(2), 171-184. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640609485177

Le Poidevin has recently presented an argument that gives rise to a serious problem for relationist theories of space. It appeals to the simple geometrical fact that if A, B and C are three points lying in a straight line, then AB and BC together ent... Read More about Space, Supervenience and Entailment.

'Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again' by M. Rowlands (2005)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2005). 'Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again' by M. Rowlands. Philosophical books, 46(3), 282-284. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.00373k.x

The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties (2004)
Journal Article
Gibb, S. (2004). The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(3), 464 - 476. https://doi.org/10.1080/713659879

It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does not face the problem of multiple realizability. However, the 'trope solution' rests upon the assumption... Read More about The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties.