Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

All Outputs (4)

Two Dogmas of the Artistic-Ethical Interaction Debate (2019)
Journal Article
Hanson, L. (2020). Two Dogmas of the Artistic-Ethical Interaction Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(2), 209-222. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.13

Can artworks be morally good or bad? Many philosophers have thought so. Does this moral goodness or badness bear on how good or bad a work is as art? This is very much a live debate. Autonomists argue that moral value is not relevant to artistic valu... Read More about Two Dogmas of the Artistic-Ethical Interaction Debate.

Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim (2018)
Journal Article
Hanson, L. (2018). Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim. Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, 129(1), 39-69. https://doi.org/10.1086/698732

Many people accept, at least implicitly, what I call the asymmetry claim: the view that moral realism is more defensible than aesthetic realism. This article challenges the asymmetry claim. I argue that it is surprisingly hard to find points of contr... Read More about Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim.

Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness (2017)
Journal Article
Hanson, L. (2017). Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 75(4), 415-427. https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12401

It is common to distinguish between attributive and predicative goodness. There are good reasons to think that artistic value is a kind of attributive goodness. Surprisingly, however, much debate in philosophical aesthetics has proceeded as though ar... Read More about Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness.

The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (2016)
Journal Article
Hanson, L. (2016). The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Philosophical Quarterly, 67(268), 508-533. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw075

There is a substantial literature on evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) in metaethics. According to these arguments, evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs pose a significant problem for moral realism, specifically by committing the real... Read More about The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.