Louise Hanson
Two Dogmas of the Artistic-Ethical Interaction Debate
Hanson, Louise
Authors
Abstract
Can artworks be morally good or bad? Many philosophers have thought so. Does this moral goodness or badness bear on how good or bad a work is as art? This is very much a live debate. Autonomists argue that moral value is not relevant to artistic value; interactionists argue that it is. In this paper, I argue that the debate between interactionists and autonomists has been conducted unfairly: all parties to the debate have tacitly accepted a set of constraints which prejudices the issue against the interactionist. I identify two demands which are routinely placed on arguments seeking to establish interaction and argue that they are, in fact, mutually conflicting. There are two upshots. First, in light of this, it is unsurprising that arguments for interaction have failed to meet with everybody’s satisfaction. The constraints are such that no argument can meet them. Second, recognizing this helps us uncover a new, promising, but hitherto overlooked strategy for establishing artistic-ethical interaction.
Citation
Hanson, L. (2020). Two Dogmas of the Artistic-Ethical Interaction Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(2), 209-222. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.13
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Online Publication Date | Oct 24, 2019 |
Publication Date | Feb 29, 2020 |
Deposit Date | May 10, 2020 |
Publicly Available Date | May 11, 2020 |
Journal | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
Print ISSN | 0045-5091 |
Electronic ISSN | 1911-0820 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 50 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 209-222 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.13 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1264625 |
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Copyright Statement
This article has been published in a revised form in Canadian journal of philosophy. http://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.13. This version is published under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND. No commercial re-distribution or re-use allowed. Derivative works cannot be distributed. © The Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
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