Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge
(2017)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2017). Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge. Journal of ethics & social philosophy, 12(3), 312-318. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.279
All Outputs (4)
Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness (2017)
Journal Article
Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2019). Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(3), 606-622. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12470
Ethical Judgment and Motivation (2017)
Book Chapter
Faraci, D., & McPherson, T. (2017). Ethical Judgment and Motivation. In T. McPherson, & D. Plunkett (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of metaethics (308-323). Routledge
On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity (2017)
Book Chapter
Faraci, D. (2017). On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics (244-264). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0010In print, the central objection to expressivism has been the Frege–Geach problem. Yet most cognitivists seem to be motivated by “deeper” worries, ones they have spent comparatively little time pursuing in print. Part of the explanation for this misma... Read More about On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity.