Against global aims for science: values, epistemic priority, and a local aims approach

Lusk, Greg; Elliott, Kevin C.

Abstract

Philosophers commonly make claims about the aims of science, and these claims have played a significant role in debates about topics like scientific realism, modeling, and idealization. Nevertheless, there has been little discussion about the basis for those aims or the source of justification for claims about those aims. We use recent debates about the appropriate roles for values in science to bring this lack of discussion to the fore. These debates raise the question of whether there are global aims that apply to all areas of science. In response to this question, we examine a variety of different ways of conceptualizing the aims of science and conclude that no matter how one conceptualizes them, there do not appear to be convincing arguments for the view that science has global aims that constrain the influence of local aims on scientific practice. Thus, we place the burden of proof on those who claim that science has one or more global aims of this sort to show how those aims can be justified. Furthermore, we develop an account of scientific normativity that relies solely on local aims. When applied to debates about values in science, this view vindicates the cogency of what we call an “equal aims” approach to managing roles for values in science. Abandoning global aims might seem to raise the potential for epistemic corruption in science, but we argue that this concern is not compelling. We conclude that a local conception of scientific aims provides the foundation for a highly naturalized and engaged approach to the philosophy of science.

Citation

Lusk, G., & Elliott, K. C. (2024). Against global aims for science: values, epistemic priority, and a local aims approach. Synthese, 204(2), Article 47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04633-9

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 7, 2024
• Online Publication Date: Jul 18, 2024
• Publication Date: 2024-08
• Deposit Date: Aug 16, 2024
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 16, 2024
• Journal: Synthese
• Print ISSN: 0039-7857
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-0964
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 204
• Issue: 2
• Article Number: 47
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04633-9
• Keywords: Realism and anti-realism, Aim of science, Science and values, Epistemic priority
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2756993