William Peden
Imprecise probability and the measurement of Keynes’s 'Weight of arguments'
Peden, William
Authors
Abstract
Many philosophers argue that Keynes’s concept of the “weight of arguments” is an important aspect of argument appraisal. The weight of an argument is the quantity of relevant evidence cited in the premises. However, this dimension of argumentation does not have a received method for formalisation. Kyburg has suggested a measure of weight that uses the degree of imprecision in his system of “Evidential Probability” to quantify weight. I develop and defend this approach to measuring weight. I illustrate the usefulness of this measure by employing it to develop an answer to Popper’s Paradox of Ideal Evidence.
Citation
Peden, W. (2018). Imprecise probability and the measurement of Keynes’s 'Weight of arguments'
| Journal Article Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Publication Date | Jun 23, 2018 |
| Deposit Date | Aug 14, 2018 |
| Publicly Available Date | Aug 14, 2018 |
| Journal | The IfCoLog journal of logics and their applications. |
| Print ISSN | 2055-3706 |
| Electronic ISSN | 2055-3714 |
| Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 699-708 |
| Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1699904 |
| Publisher URL | http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/ifcolog/?00023 |
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