Alexander J. Malt
Methodological individualism : true and false
Malt, Alexander J.
Authors
Abstract
I apply Hayek’s distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism to methodological individualism. Hayek traced ‘false’ individualism to Cartesian rationalism; Hayek’s rejection of Mises’ praxeology was due to its rationalist underpinnings. The first half of this paper identifies praxeology’s foundational philosophical concepts, emphasising their Cartesian nature, and illustrates how together they constitute a case for methodological individualism: intuition and deduction; reductionism; judgement; dualism. In the second half of this paper, I draw upon philosophy and cognitive science to articulate ‘Hayekian’ (N.B. not Hayek’s) alternatives to these Cartesian concepts. The Hayekian alternative allows a ‘gestalt switch’ from the individual- to the system-level perspective. I therefore suggest that methodological individualism is both true and false: true, in that economic phenomena are grounded in the actions of individuals; false, in that certain problems might be reconceived/discovered at the system-level. I finish by suggesting three avenues of research at system-level: optimisation; stigmergy; computational complexity.
Citation
Malt, A. J. (2018). Methodological individualism : true and false. Review of Austrian Economics, 31(1), 73-109. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-016-0373-9
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Publication Date | Mar 1, 2018 |
Deposit Date | Jan 25, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Jan 25, 2018 |
Journal | Review of Austrian Economics |
Print ISSN | 0889-3047 |
Electronic ISSN | 1573-7128 |
Publisher | Springer |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 31 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 73-109 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-016-0373-9 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1699842 |
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