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Methodological individualism : true and false

Malt, Alexander J.

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Authors

Alexander J. Malt



Abstract

I apply Hayek’s distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism to methodological individualism. Hayek traced ‘false’ individualism to Cartesian rationalism; Hayek’s rejection of Mises’ praxeology was due to its rationalist underpinnings. The first half of this paper identifies praxeology’s foundational philosophical concepts, emphasising their Cartesian nature, and illustrates how together they constitute a case for methodological individualism: intuition and deduction; reductionism; judgement; dualism. In the second half of this paper, I draw upon philosophy and cognitive science to articulate ‘Hayekian’ (N.B. not Hayek’s) alternatives to these Cartesian concepts. The Hayekian alternative allows a ‘gestalt switch’ from the individual- to the system-level perspective. I therefore suggest that methodological individualism is both true and false: true, in that economic phenomena are grounded in the actions of individuals; false, in that certain problems might be reconceived/discovered at the system-level. I finish by suggesting three avenues of research at system-level: optimisation; stigmergy; computational complexity.

Citation

Malt, A. J. (2018). Methodological individualism : true and false. Review of Austrian Economics, 31(1), 73-109. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-016-0373-9

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Mar 1, 2018
Deposit Date Jan 25, 2018
Publicly Available Date Jan 25, 2018
Journal Review of Austrian Economics
Print ISSN 0889-3047
Electronic ISSN 1573-7128
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 31
Issue 1
Pages 73-109
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-016-0373-9
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1699842

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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
Advance online version © The Author(s) 2016.
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.






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