Who Is Entitled to Forgive? A Study of ‘Third-Party’ and ‘Proxy’ Forgiveness

Scarre, Geoffrey

Abstract

Is it ever admissible for a ‘third party’ to grant forgiveness to an offender for an injury committed against another person? A distinction should be drawn between cases in which someone offers her own forgiveness to an offender for an injury inflicted on another person (‘autonomous third-party forgiveness’) and cases in which she forgives (or purports to forgive) on behalf of that victim (‘deputatory third-party forgiveness’). I argue that deputatory third-party forgiveness is always illegitimate, being an usurpation of the victim’s inalienable prerogative, but that autonomous third-party forgiveness can sometimes be in order where a sympathetic third-party feels her own resentment for the harm visited by the offender on the victim. However, because sympathy with victimhood is not itself victimhood, autonomous third-party forgiveness can never substitute for or supplant the victim’s own forgiveness.

Citation

Scarre, G. (2022). Who Is Entitled to Forgive? A Study of ‘Third-Party’ and ‘Proxy’ Forgiveness. In P. Satne, & K. M. Scheiter (Eds.), Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment (207-222). (1). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77807-1_11

• Online Publication Date: May 6, 2022
• Publication Date: 2022
• Deposit Date: May 16, 2022
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Pages: 207-222
• Edition: 1
• Book Title: Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment
• Chapter Number: 11
• ISBN: 978-3-030-77806-4
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77807-1_11
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1650643