Sensation and the Grammar of Life: Anscombe’s Procedure and Her Purpose

Mac Cumhaill, Clare; Wiseman, Rachael

Abstract

Anscombe’s published writings, lectures, and notes on sensation offer material for a sophisticated critique of philosophical theories of perception and a novel analysis of the concept of sensation. Her philosophy of perception begins with the traditional question, ‘What are the objects of sensation?’, but the response is a grammatical rather than ontological enquiry. What, she asks, are the characteristics of the grammatical object of sensation verbs? Anscombe’s answer is: sensation verbs take ‘intentional objects’, where an ‘intentional object’ is a description which has the characteristics of the concept of intention—characteristics elucidated in detail in her Intention. This allows Anscombe to reject two opposing positions—that the objects of sensation are sense data, and that they are ordinary objects. Both views, she argues, fail to recognize the grammatical fact that verbs of sensation take intentional objects. This chapter sets out Anscombe’s analysis and outlines the case for a grammatical methodology. Along the way, it will be shown that Anscombe’s philosophy of perception should not be read as forerunning contemporary representationalism.

Citation

Mac Cumhaill, C., & Wiseman, R. (2021). Sensation and the Grammar of Life: Anscombe’s Procedure and Her Purpose. In H. Logue, & L. Richardson (Eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception (276-294). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0014

• Online Publication Date: May 20, 2021
• Publication Date: 2021-05
• Deposit Date: Nov 7, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: May 20, 2023
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Pages: 276-294
• Book Title: Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception
• ISBN: 9780198853534
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0014
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1630247