Dr Thomas Renstrom t.i.renstrom@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor
Endogenous firm objectives
Renstrom, T.; Yalcin, E.
Authors
E. Yalcin
Abstract
We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decisions are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short–selling constraints, the only equilibrium is the efficient one. With short–selling constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights to market power.
Citation
Renstrom, T., & Yalcin, E. (2003). Endogenous firm objectives. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5(1), 67-94. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00122
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Publication Date | 2003-01 |
Deposit Date | Aug 19, 2008 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
Print ISSN | 1097-3923 |
Electronic ISSN | 1467-9779 |
Publisher | Wiley |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 67-94 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00122 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1564809 |
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