Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Driessen, T.S.H.; Paulusma, D.

Abstract

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.

Citation

Driessen, T., & Paulusma, D. (2001). Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 53(1), 35-49. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000099

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Apr 1, 2001
• Deposit Date: Oct 13, 2009
• Journal: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
• Print ISSN: 1432-2994
• Electronic ISSN: 1432-5217
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 53
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 35-49
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000099
• Keywords: Cooperative game, Poset, Probability distribution, Shapley value.
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1555854