G. Negro
Category signaling and reputation
Negro, G.; Hannan, M.T.; Fassiotto, M.
Authors
M.T. Hannan
M. Fassiotto
Abstract
We propose that category membership can operate as a collective market signal for quality when low-quality producers face higher costs of gaining membership. The strength of membership as a collective signal increases with the sharpness of the category boundary, that is, contrast. Our empirical study focuses on biodynamic and organic viticulture in Alsace.
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Online Publication Date | Sep 25, 2014 |
Publication Date | Mar 1, 2015 |
Deposit Date | Jul 20, 2015 |
Publicly Available Date | Jul 30, 2015 |
Journal | Organization Science |
Print ISSN | 1047-7039 |
Electronic ISSN | 1526-5455 |
Publisher | Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 26 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 584-600 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0935 |
Keywords | Sociology of markets, Organization theory, Signaling, Reputation, Categories, Wine industry, Alsace. |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1425024 |
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