Category signaling and reputation

Negro, G.; Hannan, M.T.; Fassiotto, M.

Abstract

We propose that category membership can operate as a collective market signal for quality when low-quality producers face higher costs of gaining membership. The strength of membership as a collective signal increases with the sharpness of the category boundary, that is, contrast. Our empirical study focuses on biodynamic and organic viticulture in Alsace.

Citation

Negro, G., Hannan, M., & Fassiotto, M. (2015). Category signaling and reputation. Organization Science, 26(2), 584-600. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0935

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Sep 25, 2014
• Publication Date: Mar 1, 2015
• Deposit Date: Jul 20, 2015
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 30, 2015
• Journal: Organization Science
• Print ISSN: 1047-7039
• Electronic ISSN: 1526-5455
• Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 584-600
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0935
• Keywords: Sociology of markets, Organization theory, Signaling, Reputation, Categories, Wine industry, Alsace.
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1425024