Naturalism, Experience, and Hume’s ‘Science of Human Nature’

Smith, Benedict

Abstract

A standard interpretation of Hume’s naturalism is that it paved the way for a scientistic and ‘disenchanted’ conception of the world. My aim in this paper is to show that this is a restrictive reading of Hume, and it obscures a different and profitable interpretation of what Humean naturalism amounts to. The standard interpretation implies that Hume’s ‘science of human nature’ was a reductive investigation into our psychology. But, as Hume explains, the subject matter of this science is not restricted to introspectively accessible mental content and incorporates our social nature and interpersonal experience. Illuminating the science of human nature has implications for how we understand what Hume means by ‘experience’ and thus how we understand the context of his epistemological investigations. I examine these in turn and argue overall that Hume’s naturalism and his science of man do not simply anticipate a disenchanted conception of the world.

Citation

Smith, B. (2016). Naturalism, Experience, and Hume’s ‘Science of Human Nature’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24(3), 310-323. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2016.1176389

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 25, 2016
• Online Publication Date: May 20, 2016
• Publication Date: May 20, 2016
• Deposit Date: Apr 25, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 20, 2017
• Journal: International Journal of Philosophical Studies
• Print ISSN: 0967-2559
• Electronic ISSN: 1466-4542
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 24
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 310-323
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2016.1176389
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1413909