Against Truth-Conditional Theories of Meaning: Three Lessons from the Language(s) of Fiction

Uckelman, Sara L.; Chan, Phoebe

Abstract

Fictional discourse and fictional languages provide useful test cases for theories of meaning. In this paper, we argue against truth-conditional accounts of meaning on the basis of problems posed by language(s) of fiction. It is well-known how fictional discourse—discourse about nonexistent objects—poses a problem for truth-conditional theories of meaning. Less well-considered, however, are the problems posed by fictional languages, which can be created to either be meaningful or not to be meaningful; both of these ultimately also provide problems for a truthconditional account of meaning, because it cannot account for the ways in which we use and evaluate such fictional languages. Instead, a pragmatic or use-based account provides a better explanation for some of the phenomena we discuss.

Citation

Uckelman, S. L., & Chan, P. (2016). Against Truth-Conditional Theories of Meaning: Three Lessons from the Language(s) of Fiction. Res Philosophica, 2(93), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2016.2.93.4

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 15, 2015
• Online Publication Date: Oct 14, 2015
• Publication Date: Apr 1, 2016
• Deposit Date: Jul 15, 2015
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 14, 2016
• Journal: Res Philosophica
• Print ISSN: 2168-9105
• Electronic ISSN: 2168-9113
• Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 2
• Issue: 93
• Pages: 1-19
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2016.2.93.4
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1405085