Metaphysics and The Anti-Metaphysics of the Self.

Hamilton, Andy

Abstract

The modern conception of self-consciousness holds that, in self-conscious thought, I think of myself as both subject and object; and that the subject is essentially embodied. This understanding begins with Kant. An anti-metaphysical treatment regards 'What is a self?' as expressing a pseudo-problem; it regards the claim of an immaterial self as nonsensical, and diagnoses its postulation. A moderate anti- metaphysical position analyses self-consciousness by appeal to the Analytic Principle: that self-consciousness is a phenom-enon expressed -- or interpreted -- by use of a device with the pro-perties of the first person. This article proposes a strong interpreta-tion of the Principle, involving the conceptual holism of self-consciousness and self-reference. But how essential is the use of 'I' to self-consciousness? In the name-user scenario, each speaker uses their own name self-consciously to self-refer. However, in this scenario, against appearances, 'I' is not in fact eliminated without loss of the language's expressive power, and so the Analytic Principle is preserved.

Citation

Hamilton, A. (2015). Metaphysics and The Anti-Metaphysics of the Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22(11-12), 60-83

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Jan 1, 2015
• Publication Date: 2015-01
• Deposit Date: Nov 2, 2015
• Journal: Journal of Consciousness Studies
• Print ISSN: 1355-8250
• Publisher: Imprint Academic
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 22
• Issue: 11-12
• Pages: 60-83
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1398751
• Publisher URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/jcs/2015/00000022/F0020011/art00004