Toleration, decency and self-determination in The Law of Peoples

Maffettone, Pietro

Abstract

In this article I address two objections to Rawls’ account of international toleration. The first claims that the idea of a decent people does not cohere with Rawls’ understanding of reasonable pluralism and sanctions the oppressive use of state power. The second argues that liberal peoples would agree to a more expansive set of principles in the first original position of Law of Peoples. Contra the first I argue that it does not properly distinguish between the use of state power aimed at curtailing difference and the oppressive use of state power. Contra the second I argue that transposing a liberal egalitarian set of principles in Law of Peoples would entail the unnecessary duplication of entitlements within different levels of governance and affect liberal peoples’ self-determination. The article also highlights how these criticisms are premised on the assumption that all societies should be liberal and that the correct view of global justice is a cosmopolitan one.

Citation

Maffettone, P. (2015). Toleration, decency and self-determination in The Law of Peoples. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 41(6), 537-556. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453714567736

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Jan 23, 2015
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2015
• Deposit Date: Mar 10, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 13, 2017
• Journal: Philosophy and Social Criticism
• Print ISSN: 0191-4537
• Electronic ISSN: 1461-734X
• Publisher: SAGE Publications
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 41
• Issue: 6
• Pages: 537-556
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453714567736
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1383573