Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?

Cowie, Christopher

Abstract

In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies, 174(12), 3021-3039. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0844-7

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Dec 18, 2016
• Publication Date: Dec 1, 2017
• Deposit Date: Sep 6, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 24, 2017
• Journal: Philosophical studies
• Print ISSN: 0031-8116
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-0883
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 174
• Issue: 12
• Pages: 3021-3039
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0844-7
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1377075
• Related Public URLs: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/262822