Should We Tolerate Benevolent Absolutisms?

Maffettone, Pietro

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the real problem with Rawls’s view of international toleration is that, properly understood, it seems not too inclusive, but not inclusive enough. I examine the standing of what Rawls calls “benevolent absolutisms.” According to Rawls, their lack of internal mechanisms of collective will-formation means that benevolent absolutisms cannot be seen as members in good standing of the Society of Peoples. I claim that if we accept the best reconstruction of Rawls’s argument for tolerating decent peoples, then The Law of Peoples does not provide conclusive reasons not to tolerate benevolent absolutisms.

Citation

Maffettone, P. (2016). Should We Tolerate Benevolent Absolutisms?. Social Theory and Practice, 42(3), 525-554. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201642315

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 25, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Jul 1, 2016
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2016
• Deposit Date: Mar 10, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 13, 2017
• Journal: Social Theory and Practice
• Print ISSN: 0037-802X
• Electronic ISSN: 2154-123X
• Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 42
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 525-554
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201642315
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1362779
• Publisher URL: https://www.pdcnet.org//pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=soctheorpract&id=soctheorpract_2016_0042_0003_0525_0554&onlyautologin=true