A meta-allocation mechanism in cooperative bargaining

Anbarci, N.; Yi, G.

Abstract

We analyze an iterative meta-allocation mechanism, the Minimal Agreement Procedure, which can be used to resolve bargaining conflicts generated by players' proposal of differing solution concepts in two-person cooperative bargaining. At each stage of the iteration, our procedure improves the disagreement point so that its limit is on the Pareto frontier.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Yi, G. (1992). A meta-allocation mechanism in cooperative bargaining. Economics Letters, 38(2), 175-179. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765%2892%2990050-9

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 1992-02
• Deposit Date: Aug 17, 2018
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Print ISSN: 0165-1765
• Electronic ISSN: 1873-7374
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 38
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 175-179
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765%2892%2990050-9
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1322810