Kant and Degrees of Responsibility

Saunders, Joe

Abstract

Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant's framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.

Citation

Saunders, J. (2019). Kant and Degrees of Responsibility. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 36(1), 137-154. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12293

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Jan 4, 2018
• Publication Date: Feb 28, 2019
• Deposit Date: Sep 26, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Jan 4, 2020
• Journal: Journal of Applied Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0264-3758
• Electronic ISSN: 1468-5930
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 36
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 137-154
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12293
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1318601