Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason

Saunders, Joe

Abstract

In his pre-critical lectures on rational psychology, Kant employs an argument from the I to the transcendental freedom of the soul. In the (A-edition of the) first Critique, he distances himself from rational psychology, and instead offers four paralogisms of this doctrine, insisting that ‘I think’ no longer licenses any inferences about a soul. Kant also comes alive to the possibility that we could be thinking mechanisms - rational beings, but not agents. These developments rob him of his pre-critical rationalist argument for freedom. In the Groundwork, this is a serious problem; if we are not free, morality will be a phantasm for us. In Groundwork III, Kant attempts to overcome this by offering a new argument for our freedom, involving the standpoint of practical reason. In this paper, I detail these developments and present a practical and phenomenological reading of Kant’s approach in Groundwork III. I also venture a defence of this new argument.

Citation

Saunders, J. (2014). Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason. Kant Yearbook, 6(1), 115-136. https://doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2014-0107

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Aug 21, 2014
• Publication Date: 2014
• Deposit Date: Oct 16, 2018
• Journal: Kant Yearbook
• Print ISSN: 1868-4599
• Electronic ISSN: 1868-4602
• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 6
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 115-136
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2014-0107
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1316389