Is consciousness transcendent?

Goff, P.

Abstract

In this paper, I will discuss James Tartaglia’s view on consciousness, as laid out in chapters 4 and 5 of Philosophy in a Meaningless life. Chapter 4 is an excellent critique of physicalist accounts of consciousness. In chapter 5, Tartaglia develops an original and intriguing alternative: the ‘transcendent hypothesis’, the view that both consciousness and the physical world it puts us in touch with are elements of a reality whose nature is entirely unknown. I will raise small concerns about the critique of physicalism. More broadly, I worry that there is a tension between chapter 4 and chapter 5: it seems to me that if the arguments of chapter 5 succeed in demonstrating that consciousness is unknowable, then this undermines the anti-physicalist arguments of chapter 4. Finally, I will respond to Tartaglia’s rejection of more standard alternatives to physicalism.

Citation

Goff, P. (2017). Is consciousness transcendent?. Journal of philosophy of life, 7(1), 21-32

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Jul 31, 2017
• Publication Date: 2017-07
• Deposit Date: Oct 23, 2018
• Journal: Journal of philosophy of life
• Publisher: School of Human Sciences, Waseda University
• Volume: 7
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 21-32
• Publisher URL: http://www.philosophyoflife.org/jpl201703si.pdf