George Alexandridis
Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions Around the World: New Evidence
Alexandridis, George; Petmezas, Dimitris; Travlos, Nickolaos
Abstract
Using a global M&A data set, this paper provides evidence that the empirical observations relating public acquisitions to, at best, zero abnormal returns, and their stock-financed subset to negative abnormal returns for acquiring firms around the deal announcement are not unanimous across countries. Acquirers beyond the most competitive takeover markets (the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada) pay lower premia and realize gains, while share-for-share offers are at least non-value-destroying for their shareholders. In contrast, target shareholders within these markets gain significantly less, implying that the benefits generated are more evenly split between the involved parties.
Citation
Alexandridis, G., Petmezas, D., & Travlos, N. (2010). Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions Around the World: New Evidence. Financial Management, 39(4), 1671-1695. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2010.01126.x
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Online Publication Date | Dec 6, 2010 |
Publication Date | 2010 |
Deposit Date | Aug 2, 2020 |
Journal | Financial Management |
Print ISSN | 0046-3892 |
Electronic ISSN | 1755-053X |
Publisher | Wiley |
Volume | 39 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 1671-1695 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2010.01126.x |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1265068 |
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