Some Hope for Kant’s Groundwork III

Saunders, Joe

Abstract

Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: 1. A rational will is a free will 2. A free will stands under the moral law 3. Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law In this paper, I attempt to defuse two prominent objections to this argument. Commentators often worry that Kant has not managed to establish that we are rational beings with wills in the first place, and that he equivocates in his use of ‘free’ between premise 1 and 2. I argue that both of these objections can be overcome, and thus seek to offer some hope for Kant’s approach in Groundwork III.

Citation

Saunders, J. (online). Some Hope for Kant’s Groundwork III. Inquiry, https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2021.1997798

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Oct 22, 2021
• Online Publication Date: Dec 6, 2021
• Publication Date: Dec 6, 2021
• Deposit Date: Oct 20, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Dec 21, 2021
• Journal: Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0020-174X
• Electronic ISSN: 1502-3923
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2021.1997798
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1233891