Influences of family ownership on dividend policy under mandatory dividend rules

Sikalidis, Alexandros; Bozos, Konstantinos; Chantziaras, Antonios; Grose, Christos

Abstract

We explore the relationship between family ownership and dividend policy in an insider financial system under mandatory dividend rules. In a civil law insider institutional setting like ours, the concentration of management control in the hands of family members in combination with poor corporate governance makes the expropriation of minorities more likely for high levels of family ownership leading potentially to lower dividend payouts. We theorize on the competing effects of the alignment and entrenchment hypotheses of family control and how the dividend supply and demand mechanisms explain dividend payout decisions. We empirically demonstrate a U-shaped relationship between dividends and family ownership- akin to previously documented dividend patterns across Anglo-American firms- in line with the alignment effects on the supply of dividends and the entrenchment effects on the demand of dividends. Meanwhile, high levels of family ownership increase the likelihood that the mandatory (minimum) dividend requirement is waived. Investment opportunities and the firm’s risk profile moderate the shape and strength of the above relationships.

Citation

Sikalidis, A., Bozos, K., Chantziaras, A., & Grose, C. (2022). Influences of family ownership on dividend policy under mandatory dividend rules. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 59(3), 939-967. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-022-01064-w

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 10, 2022
• Online Publication Date: May 11, 2022
• Publication Date: 2022-10
• Deposit Date: Jun 21, 2022
• Publicly Available Date: May 11, 2023
• Journal: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
• Print ISSN: 0924-865X
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-7179
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 59
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 939-967
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-022-01064-w
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1200462