All Outputs (12)

What is a “sense of foreshortened future?” A phenomenological study of trauma, trust, and time (2014)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M., Ruddell, M., & Smith, B. (2014). What is a “sense of foreshortened future?” A phenomenological study of trauma, trust, and time. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, Article 1026. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01026

One of the symptoms of trauma is said to be a “sense of foreshortened future.” Without further qualification, it is not clear how to interpret this. In this paper, we offer a phenomenological account of what the experience consists of. To do so, we f... Read More about What is a “sense of foreshortened future?” A phenomenological study of trauma, trust, and time.

Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy. (2012)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2012). Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy. Inquiry, 55(5), 473-495. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2012.716196

This paper proposes that adopting a ‘phenomenological stance’ enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other p... Read More about Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy..

What is Touch? (2012)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2012). What is Touch?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(3), 413-432. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.598173

This paper addresses the nature of touch or ‘tactual perception’. I argue that touch encompasses a wide range of perceptual achievements, that treating it as a number of separate senses will not work, and that the permissive conception we are left wi... Read More about What is Touch?.

Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth. (2010)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2010). Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth. Inquiry, 53(6), 602-626. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2010.526324

It is generally maintained that emotions consist of intentional states and/or bodily feelings. This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of guilt in severe depression, in order to illustrate how such conceptions fail to adequately accommodate a w... Read More about Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth..

There are no Folk Psychological Narratives (2009)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2009). There are no Folk Psychological Narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(6-8), 379-406

I argue that the task of describing our so-called ‘folk psychology’ requires difficult philosophical work. Consequently, any statement of the folk view is actually a debatable philosophical position, rather than an uncontroversial description of pre-... Read More about There are no Folk Psychological Narratives.

Touch and Situatedness (2008)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2008). Touch and Situatedness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16(3), 299-322. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550802110827

This paper explores the phenomenology of touch and proposes that the structure of touch serves to cast light on the more general way in which we 'find ourselves in a world'. Recent philosophical work on perception tends to emphasize vision. This, I s... Read More about Touch and Situatedness.

The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion (2008)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review, 41(2), 195-216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-008-9078-5

This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is ge... Read More about The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion.

The Feeling of Being (2005)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2005). The Feeling of Being. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12(8-10), 43-60

There has been much recent philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between emotion and feeling. However, everyday talk of 'feeling' is not restricted to emotional feeling and the current emphasis on emotions has led to a neglect of other... Read More about The Feeling of Being.

William James on Emotion and Intentionality (2005)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2005). William James on Emotion and Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 13(2), 179-202. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550500080405

William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in... Read More about William James on Emotion and Intentionality.

An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology (2005)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2005). An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 19(1), 47-63. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698590500051126

This paper draws out an epistemological tension implicit in Cosmides and Tooby's conception of evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby think of the mind as a collection of functionally individuated, domain-specific modules. Although they do not e... Read More about An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology.

Realism, Biologism and 'The Background' (2004)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2004). Realism, Biologism and 'The Background'. Philosophical Explorations, 7(2), 149-166. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790410001694499

John Searle claims that intentional states require a set of non-intentional background capacities in order to function. He insists that this ‘Background’ should be construed naturalistically, in terms of the causal properties of biological brains. Th... Read More about Realism, Biologism and 'The Background'.

Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience (2003)
Journal Article
Ratcliffe, M. (2003). Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience. Religious Studies, 39(3), 323-345. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412503006413

In this paper, I consider V. S. Ramachandran's in principle agnosticism concerning whether neurological studies of religious experience can be taken as support for the claim that God really does communicate with people during religious experiences. C... Read More about Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience.