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Outputs (119)

Dynamic costs of the draft (2004)
Journal Article
Lau, M., Poutvaara, P., & Wagener, A. (2004). Dynamic costs of the draft. German Economic Review, 5(4), 381-406. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-6485.2004.00114.x

We propose a dynamic general-equilibrium model with human capital accumulation to evaluate the economic consequences of compulsory services (such as military draft or social work). Our analysis identifies a so far ignored dynamic cost arising from di... Read More about Dynamic costs of the draft.

Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents? (2004)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Swarthout, J. (2004). Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 59(3), 359-373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354

We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting de... Read More about Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?.

Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games. (2004)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Walker, M. (2004). Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games. Journal of Economic Theory, 114(2), 280-309. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531%2803%2900125-x

We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the s... Read More about Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games..

Hide and seek in Arizona. (2003)
Journal Article
Rosenthal, R., Shachat, J., & Walker, M. (2003). Hide and seek in Arizona. International Journal of Game Theory, 32(2), 273-293. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300159

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of “hide and seek”. Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player’s ro... Read More about Hide and seek in Arizona..

Trust, the Internet, and the digital divide (2003)
Journal Article
Huang, H., Keser, C., Leland, J., & Shachat, J. (2003). Trust, the Internet, and the digital divide. IBM systems journal, 42(3), 507-518. https://doi.org/10.1147/sj.423.0507

The Internet is expected to have a positive impact on economic growth, and its adoption rate will determine the extent of this impact. In this paper, we examine how differences in willingness to trust influence Internet adoption rates across countrie... Read More about Trust, the Internet, and the digital divide.

Policy Reform Without Tears. (2002)
Book Chapter
Harrison, G., Jensen, J., Lau, M., & Rutherford, T. (2002). Policy Reform Without Tears. In A. Fossati, & W. Wiegaard (Eds.), Policy Evaluation with Computable General Equilibrium Models (20-38). Routledge

Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis (2002)
Journal Article
Shachat, J. (2002). Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis. Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1), 189-226. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2915

This paper reports on a set of experiments designed to discriminate among the possible sources of the failure of the unique mixed strategy minimax equilibrium of the O'Neill (1987) game. This is accomplished by introducing a new methodology for elici... Read More about Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis.

Approximating infinite-horizon models in a complementarity format: A primer in dynamic general equilibrium analysis. (2002)
Journal Article
Lau, M., Pahlke, A., & Rutherford, T. (2002). Approximating infinite-horizon models in a complementarity format: A primer in dynamic general equilibrium analysis. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26(4), 577-609. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889%2800%2900071-3

We demonstrate the advantages of the complementarity formulation for approximating infinite-horizon equilibria in neoclassical growth models as compared with techniques originally developed for optimal planning models. The complementarity approach do... Read More about Approximating infinite-horizon models in a complementarity format: A primer in dynamic general equilibrium analysis..

On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games. (2001)
Journal Article
Wooders, J., & Shachat, J. (2001). On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 34(2), 342-363. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0808

We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is st... Read More about On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games..

An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play. (2001)
Journal Article
Cox, J., Shachat, J., & Walker, M. (2001). An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play. Games and Economic Behavior, 34(1), 11-33. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0786

We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan's model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects' choices... Read More about An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play..

Assessing Tax Reforms When Human Capital is Endogenous. (2000)
Book Chapter
Lau, M. (2000). Assessing Tax Reforms When Human Capital is Endogenous. In G. Harrison, S. Jensen, L. Pedersen, & T. Rutherford (Eds.), Using Dynamic General Equilibrium Models for Policy Analysis (203-223). North-Holland

An Experimental Investigation of the Incentives to Form Agricultural Marketing Pools. (1998)
Journal Article
Hoffman, E., Libecap, G., & Shachat, J. (1998). An Experimental Investigation of the Incentives to Form Agricultural Marketing Pools. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42(2-3), 287-304. https://doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1998.1216

This paper presents theoretical extensions and laboratory tests of Hoffman and Libecap's (1994) model of individual firms' incentives to form agricultural marketing pools. The key incentives are lower variance in output prices and economies in scale... Read More about An Experimental Investigation of the Incentives to Form Agricultural Marketing Pools..