

1 **A case study of illegal fishing causes during seasonal fishery**
2 **closure in Kaptai Lake, Bangladesh**

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24
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29 in data analysis and writing of the manuscript; **SG** conceptualised the research, analysed the
30 data and prepared the manuscript. All authors read the manuscript and gave approval for the
31 publication.

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37

38

39 **ABSTRACT**

40

41 Growing evidence shows that conservation strategies such as fishing bans may adversely
42 affect the livelihoods of low-income communities, which often encourages community
43 members to fish illegally. In this study, we determined the underlying factors that influenced
44 fishermen to engage in illegal fishing during the closed season in the largest lake of
45 Bangladesh, Kaptai Lake. Out of 231 fishermen interviewed, 46.8% were engaged in illegal
46 fishing during the closed season. Engagement in illegal fishing was positively related to receipt
47 of a financial loan and negatively related to receipt of a government subsidy and secondary
48 occupation of the fishermen. Financial gain by selling the fish was the prime motive for illegal
49 fishing. Surprisingly, fishermen received a 36% lower price for illegally-harvested fish during
50 the closed season (mean price \pm SD, BDT 95.8 \pm 64.9), when compared to that during the
51 open fishing season (BDT 151.5 \pm 64.9). Mid-level actors secured 99 – 154% more profit
52 during the closed season. This study shows that multiple factors are important for the
53 engagement of fishermen in illegal fishing, and therefore, an integrated conservation policy
54 considering all causative factors should be employed to achieve more effective conservation
55 in the region's inland waters.

56

57 **Keywords:** Biodiversity conservation; fishing ban; illegal fishing; fisheries management; rural
58 development; alternative livelihoods.

59

60 1 INTRODUCTION

61 Illegal harvesting (i.e. poaching) is a major concern for the sustainable management of natural
62 resources, including fishes (Muth and Bowe Jr., 1998; Bell, Hampshire and Topalidou, 2007;
63 Doherty *et al.*, 2021). Illegal harvesting poses a major challenge to policy makers and resource
64 managers to make conservation efforts successful. Worldwide, losses from current illegal and
65 unreported fishing are estimated to be between \$10 billion and \$36 billion (Agnew *et al.*, 2009;
66 WorldBank, 2019). For capture fisheries, 7 – 17% of the global catch is produced through
67 illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (FAO, 2016). Therefore, illegal fishing reduces the
68 success of fish stock management and threatens fish populations across the globe (Agnew *et al.*,
69 2009). However, minimisation of this problem requires an understanding of underlying
70 factors that influence illegal harvesting of resources (Muth and Bowe Jr., 1998).

71 Fishing bans, permanent or temporary, are commonly used for fisheries management and
72 biodiversity conservation in aquatic ecosystems (Shiffman and Hammerschlag, 2016; van
73 Brakel *et al.*, 2018; Amali Infantina *et al.*, 2020). Implementation of fishing bans requires
74 consideration of socioeconomic, cultural, political, and behavioural issues of dependent
75 communities to be effective (Muth and Bowe Jr., 1998; Bell, Hampshire and Topalidou, 2007;
76 van Brakel *et al.*, 2018). Illegal fishing in marine and coastal ecosystems has received
77 widespread attention in recent times (Shiffman and Hammerschlag, 2016; Aceves-Bueno,
78 Read and Cisneros-Mata, 2021) but remains less-explored for freshwater habitats (Free,
79 Jensen and Mendsaikhan, 2015). However, freshwater fishes are being impacted by
80 numerous factors including overfishing, water pollution, habitat destruction, flow modification
81 and biological invasions (Dudgeon *et al.*, 2006; Suski and Cooke, 2007) and are considered
82 one of the most susceptible groups of freshwater organisms to endangerment (Duncan and
83 Lockwood, 2001; Arthington *et al.*, 2016). In Asia and Africa, inland water resources are
84 intensively exploited and are most at risk (Welcomme *et al.*, 2010).

85 Bangladesh is a South Asian sub-tropical country with diverse fish and other aquatic fauna.
86 The country is one of the top fish producing countries of the world, ranked third in inland
87 capture and fifth in aquaculture production (FAO, 2018; Khan *et al.*, 2022). In Bangladesh,
88 fishing bans are commonly used to manage fisheries exploitation and help conserve aquatic
89 biota, especially fishes. Both permanent and temporary fishing bans have been employed in
90 important habitats of the country (Mredul *et al.*, 2020; Shalehin, Naher and Galib, 2020).
91 However, a large number of people in Bangladesh, including 1.32 million professional
92 fishermen, almost exclusively living below the subsistence level, are solely dependent on
93 fishing for their livelihoods (DoF, 2019). Concern about the welfare of these fishermen and
94 other stakeholders is growing during temporary fishery closures (van Brakel *et al.*, 2018;
95 Mredul *et al.*, 2020). Fishing bans, including seasonal fishery closure (the 'closed season') are
96 often blamed for reduced income for fishing communities, which, in many instances, provokes
97 fishermen to fish illegally, by violating the closure (Dey *et al.*, 2010; van Brakel *et al.*, 2018;
98 Mredul *et al.*, 2020). It is often the case that fishermen receive subsidies during the closed
99 season but ineffective distribution of these also encourages fishermen to become involved in
100 illegal fishing (Mredul *et al.*, 2020; Rayhan *et al.*, 2021). In addition, financial loans at high
101 interest rates from different sources also influence the decisions of financially poor fishermen
102 over where, when and how to fish (Habib and Jan, 2021; Rayhan *et al.*, 2021).

103 This study explored the underlying factors influencing illegal fishing during the closed season
104 in Bangladesh's largest lake. Kaptai Lake is inhabited by at least 53 fish species, including 20
105 species of national conservation importance - eight endangered, six vulnerable and six near
106 threatened species (Shalehin, Naher and Galib, 2020). We hypothesised that multiple factors
107 associated with fishermen's livelihoods contributed to illegal fishing during the closed season,
108 and that illegal fishing was primarily for commercial gain. Study outcomes may help to develop
109 effective fisheries management and an improved biodiversity conservation policy, through
110 better understating of underlying issues of illegal fishing.

111

112 2 MATERIALS AND METHODS

113 2.1 Study area

114 Kaptai Lake is located in the southeast of Bangladesh (Figure 1), comprises two basins, and
115 has a total area of 68800 ha. It is a reservoir and was formed by damming the Karnaphuli
116 River in 1962. Nationally, it is an important fishery resource (Khan *et al.*, 2022) and the most
117 productive in southeast Bangladesh, with 10 152 metric tons of freshwater fishes landed in
118 the year of 2017-18 (DoF, 2019). Through the 1950 Fish Act, fishing in Kaptai Lake has been
119 prohibited between the beginning of April and mid-August since 1961, but this full closed
120 season has not been widely implemented (Rayhan *et al.*, 2021). Since 1992, a three-month
121 fishery ban in the lake, from May to July, has been enforced by the government through
122 Bangladesh Fisheries Development Corporation (BFDC), to safeguard fishes in the pre-
123 spawning and spawning periods, immediately before and during the early part of the monsoon
124 season. The lake authority (i.e. BFDC) launches patrolling operations from five different
125 stations (Rangamati Sadar, Kaptai, Mahalchhari, Marishya and Langadu) to deter illegal
126 fishing activities in the lake, usually on a daily basis, during the fishery closure period.
127 However, given the size and remote location of the lake, and lakeside ridges that block line of
128 sight across large areas of the lake, it is extremely difficult to police the whole lake consistently
129 (Rayhan *et al.*, 2021). Therefore, poaching of fishes during this seasonal fishery closure is
130 common in the lake (Shalehin, Naher and Galib, 2020).

131

132 2.2 Study approach

133 Data were collected in two stages. During the first stage, between January and April 2020,
134 260 fishermen were selected randomly, 130 from each of the north and south basins to avoid
135 spatial bias in results (Figure 1) and interviewed using a questionnaire developed (based on
136 relevant literature [Muth and Bowe Jr., 1998; Knapp, 2012; Islam *et al.*, 2017] and personal
137 experiences) for the study. Respondents were selected at the fish landing centres of the lake
138 when they brought their catch for selling. We approached four fishermen for interview (usually
139 every third person) at each landing hour covering all landing schedules of the day. The
140 questionnaire was designed to collect a wide range of demographic, socio-economic, cultural,
141 political and behavioural information of the fishermen that potentially influenced fishing
142 decisions of respondents (see Form S1 in the Supplementary information for questionnaire
143 used for data collection). Although BFDC introduced licencing for fishermen and new
144 fishermen are being brought under the licencing database every year, this is primarily for
145 distribution of subsidies during the fishery closure period, not for controlling fishing activities
146 in the lake. Therefore, fishermen engaged in fishing without a licence is very common and
147 monitoring of fishing in the lake outside the fishery closure period seldom occurs except at the
148 for seven fish sanctuaries in the lake.

149 In the second stage of study, data were collected between May and August 2020, comprising
150 the closed season (May to July) and a further period of legal fishery operation (August). During
151 this time fishermen were contacted weekly by mobile phone, to provide their fishing activity
152 status (engaged in fishing or not). Because May–July is the closed season for fishing, data
153 recorded during this stage enabled us to categorise respondents into two groups, (1)
154 fishermen who were engaged in fishing during the closure (hereafter offenders), and (2)
155 fishermen who were not engaged in fishing during the closure (hereafter law-abiding fishers).
156 However, 19 fishermen could not be reached during this stage and therefore they were
157 excluded from the analysis.

158 Fishermen belonging to the offender group were requested to disclose their motives for fishing
159 during the period of fishery closure. We gave an idea of common motives, described by Muth
160 and Bowe Jr. (1998) (Table S1), if asked for some examples by the respondent. If the fish
161 caught by a particular fisher were sold, we collected information on selling points, people

162 involved, pricing, and the marketing chain. Fishing gears used while fishing during the closed
163 season were also recorded.

164 Weekly pricing data were collected over phone from 30 fishermen and 26 farias (mid-level
165 participants in the marketing process who buy fish from fishermen at field sites ($n = 8$, four
166 from each of the north and south basins of the lake) and send them to local or distant fish
167 markets) over both data collection stages (Jan – August) to record the price of fishes at
168 different levels of the supply chain. This allowed us to compare prices and determine gross
169 profit margins between closed (May–July) and open (Jan–April and August) periods of the
170 fishery. Price and profit analysis in this study was based on six major fish species of the lake
171 (*Sperata aor*, *Corica soborna*, *Gudusia chapra*, *Labeo rohita*, *L. calbasu* and *L. bata*). Before
172 every interview, respondents were informed that their participation was voluntary and that all
173 data obtained would be kept confidential and anonymous, and would only be used for research
174 purposes.

175

176 **2.3 Data analysis**

177 All statistical tests were performed in R (version 4.0.3; R Core Team, 2020) with an α level of
178 significance of 0.05. Age, fishing experience, and education may be correlated, so a principal
179 component analysis (PCA) defined the dimensions using the R package 'psych'. Two PCA
180 factors were identified for further analysis (Table S2) based on scree plots and a broken-stick
181 model (Jackson, 1993). Age and experience were highly correlated on the same PCA axis
182 (PC1, Table S2) and therefore only one (i.e. age) was considered for further analysis. A factor
183 with a loading of >0.50 were considered to contribute to the meaning of a component due to
184 small sample size (Budaev, 2010; Galib *et al.*, 2022). Collinearity between possible categorical
185 variables (e.g. secondary occupation and financial loan) was checked by chi-square test and
186 no significant relationships were detected (all $p > 0.05$).

187 Multiple logistic regression was used to determine factors that affected the likelihood of
188 participants fishing in the lake during the closed season. A global model contained all potential
189 variables (12 variables in total; age, education, BFDC licencing status, fishing ban knowledge,
190 secondary income, land holding, other income generating member in household, financial
191 loan, advanced finance from middlemen in supply chain, government subsidy, and past history
192 of illegal fishing) and plausible models were defined with a ΔAIC of less than 2 (Burnham and
193 Anderson, 2002) using the MuMIn package in R (Bartoń, 2019) (Table S3). A model averaging
194 procedure was employed to generate the final model that included all important variables
195 (Bartoń, 2019). However, each plausible model (with $\Delta AIC < 2$) was tested and outcomes
196 were similar to the final model considered (Table S4). Several factors, including training on
197 alternative income generation, knowledge of fish law, membership of any political party were
198 not considered for analysis as all respondents answered "no" to these questions.

199 To determine effects of fishery closure on price and profit levels, repeated measures pricing
200 data were subjected to linear mixed-effects modelling (LMM) using the 'lme4' (Bates *et al.*,
201 2015) and 'lmerTest' (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff and Christensen, 2016) packages in R. During
202 analysis, fishery condition (open or closed fishery season) was considered a fixed effect,
203 whereas sampling month and fish species were considered random effects.

204 Data were explored before analysis to avoid common statistical problems (Zuur, Ieno and
205 Elphick, 2010), especially when parametric tests were used. Where needed, data were
206 subjected to log transformation to meet the assumptions for the test (McDonald, 2014).

207

208

209

210 **3 RESULTS**

211 **3.1 Demographics**

212 All participant fishers ($n = 231$) were male. Mean (\pm SD) age was 30.8 ± 8.6 and duration of
213 fishing experience was 16.0 ± 7.6 years (Table 1). Mean duration of schooling was 1.8 ± 2.7
214 years. Further, no respondent had more than 10 years of schooling and 64.9% ($n = 150$) had
215 no schooling (Table 1). Mean area of agricultural land owned by respondents was $0.002 \pm$
216 0.01 ha, and 96.1% ($n = 222$) of respondents owned no land (Table 1).

217 Fishing in the lake was the primary occupation, for earning income. However, 77.5% of
218 respondents had a secondary income source, other than fishing in the lake (Table 1). 51.9%
219 of the respondents' households had other income generating members (Table 1). Over half of
220 respondents (58.4%, $n = 135$) had taken a financial loan from a local non-government
221 organisation (NGO) at a simple interest rate above 20%. Over two thirds of respondents (67%,
222 comprising 68% law-abiding and 66% offenders) received advance finance from the
223 middlemen engaged in the supply chain at zero interest rate. Only 22 (9.5%) fishermen were
224 members of a fishing cooperative society (Table 1). None of the fishermen had any training
225 on agricultural cropping or other income generating activities. Most respondents from both
226 study groups had not obtained licences from the BFDC (offender group: $n = 102$; law-abiding
227 fishers: $n = 81$) (Table 1).

228

229 **3.2 Fishing behaviour during the seasonal fishery closure**

230 Nearly half of respondents (46.8%, $n=108$) were engaged in fishing the lake during the closed
231 season (Table 1). Overall, 98.3% ($n = 227$) of respondents, including all members of the law-
232 abiding fishers and 96.3% of the offender group, were aware of the seasonal fishing ban in
233 the lake and its duration (Table 1). More than half of respondents (54.1%, $n = 125$) had fished
234 Kaptai Lake during the closed season in the past. In 2020, 56.7% of respondents had received
235 a subsidy (20 kg rice per month per fishing household) from the government to help support
236 them during the closed season (Table 1). All fishing nets used in during the closed season
237 (small-meshed gillnets and seine nets, 35% and 65% respectively) were non-selective in
238 nature.

239

240 **3.3 Factors affecting fishing during the seasonal fishery closure**

241 Fishing during the closed season was strongly affected by financial loan, government subsidy,
242 and secondary income (Table 2). Fishing during the closed season was positively affected by
243 responders being in receipt of a financial loan and negatively by receipt of a government
244 subsidy and secondary income (Table 2). All fishermen who received a subsidy from the
245 government but engaged in fishing during the fishery closure (17.6%, Table 1) mentioned that
246 the subsidy was not adequate to fulfil their needs (100% offenders and 77% law-abiding
247 fishermen), or was distributed later than it should have been (58% offenders and 31% law-
248 abiding fishermen). No effects of ban knowledge and fishing society membership were found
249 (Table 2).

250

251 **3.4 Post-harvest distribution of fish during fishery closure**

252 All respondents reported that they consumed a small portion of fish harvested (~1% of the
253 total catch) as a part of their daily consumption (Figure 2). However, they also mentioned that
254 the prime motive for fishing during the closure period was to earn money by selling, not for
255 household consumption and they did not return any catch into the lake.

256 Fish harvested during the closed season were either sold to local consumers within the study
257 area or consumers in two of the largest cities in the country, Chattogram [= Chittagong] and
258 Dhaka (Figure 2). Fishermen engaged in illegal fishing received significantly lower prices
259 (mean \pm SD: BDT 95.8 ± 64.9 ; BDT is the Bangladeshi Taka, ~80 BDT = 1 USD) during the

260 closed season than the open season (BDT 151.1 ± 87.3). Unlike fishermen, mid-level actors
261 involved in fish distribution during the fishery closure earned 99–154% more profit (LMM: $F =$
262 $50.5 - 130.6$, $p \leq 0.001$; Figures 2 & 3). Interestingly, two thirds of members of the offender
263 group (66%) received finance from mid-level actors during the fishery closure period with a
264 condition of selling their harvested fish to them (Table 1).

265

266 **4 | DISCUSSION**

267 This study indicates that engagement in illegal fishing during a well-documented and
268 publicised closed season was very common in the study area. This practice is also common
269 in coastal or marine habitats of Bangladesh (van Brakel *et al.*, 2018; Mredul *et al.*, 2020) and
270 all over the world (FAO, 2001; Bell, Hampshire and Topalidou, 2007; Agnew *et al.*, 2009).
271 Despite knowing about the fishery closure in the lake and regular patrolling by government
272 officials, a high proportion of fishermen continued fishing, which indicates that factors were
273 more important to these fishermen than the potential risk of being caught and fined. A high
274 level of illegal fishing potentially undermines the efficacy of measures designed to manage the
275 fishery sustainably and to support wider biodiversity (FAO, 2001; Agnew *et al.*, 2009;
276 Arlinghaus *et al.*, 2015).

277

278 **4.1 Demographics**

279 All respondents surveyed were male, which was expected in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh,
280 fishing is considered a risky job that often requires going out at night (Parvez *et al.*, 2017).
281 Therefore, despite increasing participation of women in other fisheries-based professions (e.g.
282 fish processing and selling) (FAO, 2018), fishing activities were predominated by males. The
283 result is comparable to findings of others that showed fishers were all or almost exclusively
284 male in Bangladesh (Islam *et al.*, 2013; Galib *et al.*, 2016), a pattern that also tends to be
285 reflected globally (Harper *et al.*, 2020; Albright and Lucas, 2021).

286 Education is considered important in fishery management, including for the conservation of
287 resources (Albright and Lucas, 2021), but respondents surveyed in this study had a low level
288 of education. Poor education of fishermen in Bangladesh is primarily due to early engagement
289 in income generating activities to assist their families economically (Rahman *et al.*, 2020).

290

291 **4.2 Fishing behaviour and factors affecting illegal fishing**

292 Fishing during the closed season was more likely for respondents who had received a financial
293 loan. Fishing communities in Bangladesh usually rely on NGOs or individual money lenders
294 for financial loans, whose interest is much higher than from government organisations (e.g.
295 government banks, usually 9% interest rate; cf. >20% for NGO) (Islam *et al.*, 2017; Rahman
296 *et al.*, 2020). Moreover, these NGOs demand weekly instalments of repayment in most cases
297 that require fishermen to earn and repay the money regularly. Similarly, in the study area, all
298 respondents had received loans from NGOs at the higher rate. Financial loans at high interest
299 rates can make fishermen vulnerable to financial exploitation (Rahman *et al.*, 2020). At Kaptai
300 Lake, illegal fishing would likely be the primary means of earning money during the closed
301 season for respondents who have taken loans from various sources at high interest rates.

302 Illegal fishing during the closed season was less likely for those respondents in receipt of
303 government subsidies at Kaptai Lake. In Bangladesh, the government often allocates
304 subsidies (i.e. money and / or essential goods such as rice, flour, oil) to fishermen during the
305 closed season to economically assist fishing households. Unfortunately, distribution of these
306 subsidies often does not reach the bona fide fishermen and results in their engagement in
307 illegal fishing (Mredul *et al.*, 2020). This might have been the case in our study, where over
308 80% of fishermen in the offender group stated they did not receive any subsidies. Interestingly,

309 despite receiving a subsidy, a considerable proportion (about one fifth) of the offender group
310 fished illegally during the closed season. However, the government closed-season subsidy
311 often arrives late, or the amount provided is inadequate, which stimulates fishermen to fish
312 illegally (Dey *et al.*, 2010; Islam *et al.*, 2017; Mredul *et al.*, 2020), as in the study area.

313 Our model output showed that fishing during the closed season was less likely for respondents
314 with a secondary source of income. People who have income sources other than fishing would
315 likely face less difficulties to maintain their livelihood during the closed season. Income of
316 fishing households may be reduced by 50% during the seasonal fishery closure, and therefore,
317 alternative or secondary income generating activities are considered vital for the vulnerable
318 community of fishermen in Bangladesh (Dey *et al.*, 2010; Rahman *et al.*, 2020). However,
319 secondary sources of income during the closed season were generally regarded by
320 respondents as insufficient to cover livelihood costs. No respondent received training on any
321 income generating ventures, which may be a barrier to creating alternative livelihood
322 opportunities in the study area and reflects the overall scenario of poor fishermen in South
323 Asia where they have few alternative livelihood options (Panigrahi and Pattnaik, 2020;
324 Rahman *et al.*, 2020).

325 Illegal fishing impacts may have serious consequences on the Kaptai Lake fish biodiversity,
326 especially the threatened fishes of the lake (mainly siluriforms, osteoglossiforms,
327 synbranchiforms), as all the fishing nets used during the fishery closure period were non-
328 selective and no catch was returned to the lake. Fishing nets like gillnets and seine nets are
329 capable of catching fishes of almost all sizes (Galib *et al.*, 2009) widely recognised for having
330 serious negative impacts on the threatened species as well as total fish community in a habitat
331 (Mancini *et al.*, 2012; Free, Jensen and Mendsaikhan, 2015). Rayhan *et al.* (2021) report how
332 the percentage contribution of large-bodied native cyprinids to catches in Kaptai Lake has
333 declined dramatically in recent decades. Wild fish production in Kaptai Lake is now dominated
334 by three small-bodied clupeids *Corica soborna*, *Gudusia chapra* and *Gonialosa manmina*
335 (Shalehin, Naher and Galib, 2020). The shift from 80% of fishery production comprising large
336 cyprinids in 1966 (Ahmed *et al.*, 2005) to the situation now, where small-bodied clupeids
337 comprise 90% of fishery production is consistent with an overfishing scenario. Nevertheless,
338 damming of the river and resultant habitat modification associated with migration blockage
339 and habitat modification (Lucas and Baras, 2001), as well as pollution and siltation (Shalehin,
340 Naher and Galib, 2020; Rayhan *et al.*, 2021), are likely contributory factors to the observed
341 decline in large cyprinids and nationally endangered siluriforms such as *Pangasius pangasius*.

342

343 **4.3 Fate of harvested fish**

344 Most illegally harvested fish were sold for commercial gain by the fishermen to mid-level actors
345 in the supply chain, this being one of the major motives for poaching worldwide (Muth and
346 Bowe Jr., 1998). Fishermen who fished during the closed season received significantly lower
347 prices for their catch from mid-level actors in the supply chain. This may be due to: (1)
348 fishermen were exploited by the mid-level actors knowing that the harvest was illegal, or (2)
349 they had no choice but to sell their harvest to cope with issues encountered (e.g. maintaining
350 livelihoods and repaying high-interest based loans under situations when income became
351 restricted).

352 One potential limitation in our study deserves consideration. As we collected data of illegal
353 fishing over the telephone it was not possible for us to confirm if any of the respondents hid
354 his involvement in illegal fishing. However, as the participation was voluntary and data were
355 promised to be used anonymously, we believe that data obtained are likely to be reliable.

356

357 **4.4 Conclusions**

358 Fuller consideration and integration of underlying issues of fisheries and conservation
359 management plans is urged, because these have the potential to affect the success of those
360 management measures, including at Kaptai Lake. Although such statements, and the needs
361 of vulnerable stakeholders, are frequently emphasized in global reviews (Cooke *et al.*, 2016),
362 studies such as ours show that conservation actions, which appear laudable as policies, may
363 have little practical or ethical application at the local level. The issue of “closed seasons”, which
364 remain open in practice at Kaptai Lake, is parallel to the concept of “paper parks” which purport
365 to provide protected area conservation but offer little protection in reality (Pieraccini, Coppa
366 and De Lucia, 2017). Greater efforts are needed locally and globally to ensure that fisheries
367 and aquatic biodiversity protection policies achieve their intended outcomes in practice.

368 Evidently fishermen in the study area fished during the closed season due to the increased
369 pressure from loan providers, lack of alternative occupation to support livelihood adequately,
370 and insufficient or no subsidy support from the government. Therefore, an integrated
371 management policy considering all such factors is needed to enable the closed season to
372 function. We suggest that regular financial or special loans at low interest rates should be
373 sanctioned for fishermen in the study areas. We recommend timely distribution of subsidies in
374 appropriate amounts to as many Kaptai fishermen as possible. The size of the household
375 should be considered during the distribution of such support. Alternative livelihood options for
376 vulnerable fishermen should be explored and supported by the lake regulating authority (i.e.
377 BFDC and associated government organisations). Training on alternative livelihood options
378 may be effective in this regard, as reported for the mud crab fishery in Southwest Bangladesh
379 (Rahman *et al.*, 2020). This might prove effective given that none of the respondents were
380 trained in any alternative livelihood options. Increased patrolling for illegal fishing and
381 associated activities (e.g. visiting fish markets for selling of illegally harvested fish) may be
382 necessary, but this is unlikely to be suitable as a long-term solution, without concurrent
383 measures such as those described above. Currently, a small number of fishermen had
384 membership of a fisheries cooperative society, which should be expanded and brought into
385 close cooperation with lake regulatory or associated organisations. This would be helpful for
386 organising fishermen for initiatives related to biodiversity conservation in the lake involving the
387 community, a common conservation initiative worldwide with a view to improving both the
388 biodiversity and livelihood performances (Knapp, 2012; van Brakel *et al.*, 2018).

389 Ultimately, both community- and incentive-based conservation programmes may not be
390 successful until underlying economic issues are resolved. Fishing communities are among the
391 poorest communities in Bangladesh and much of southern Asia (Willmann, 2004; Rahman *et al.*,
392 2020). Therefore, to enhance the success of long-term management that employs
393 permanent or temporary fishery closure in developing regions, the affected communities
394 should be lifted out of poverty through development of alternative livelihoods.

395

396 Ethical statement

397 The lake is one of the most attractive tourist destinations in Bangladesh and open to the public,
398 so no special permission was needed to conduct this study. The study design and
399 questionnaire / data collection form used in this study was approved by the Office of the Dean
400 of the corresponding author's institution (Ref. 77/22/FisFac).

401

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541

542 **Table 1:** Descriptive summary showing major demographic, economic and knowledge of the
 543 respondent fishermen of Kaptai Lake, Bangladesh. Those fishing during the closed season on
 544 Kaptai Lake in 2020 were classed as 'offenders' and those not fishing were the 'law-abiding
 545 fishers'.

Factors	Mean \pm SD (range) or percentage (%)		
	Law-abiding fishers (n = 123)	Offender group (n = 108)	Total (n = 231)
Age (year)	28.8 \pm 6.6 (18 – 55)	33.0 \pm 9.9 (13 – 60)	30.8 \pm 8.6 (13 – 60)
<20	3	9	12
20–29	72	32	104
30–39	40	34	74
40–49	7	29	36
50–59	1	3	4
\geq 60	0	1	1
Fishing experience (year)	13.4 \pm 6.1 (5 – 30)	18.9 \pm 8.1 (3 – 40)	16 \pm 7.6 (3 – 40)
Schooling (year)	2.0 \pm 2.7 (0 – 10)	1.4 \pm 2.6 (0 – 10)	1.8 \pm 2.7 (0 – 10)
No schooling	57.7 (71)	73.1 (79)	64.9 (n=150)
Primary schooling	31.6 (39)	17.6 (19)	25.1 (n=58)
Secondary schooling	18.6 (23)	9.3 (10)	10 (n=23)
Owned agricultural land (ha)	0.001 \pm 0.01 (0–0.04)	0.002 \pm 0.02 (0–0.2)	0.002 \pm 0.01 (0 – 0.2)
Landless	94.3 (116)	98.2(106)	96.1 (222)
Secondary income (%)			
Yes	60	92.7	77.5
No	40	7.3	22.5
Other income generating member in household (%)			
Yes	55.3	48.1	51.9
No	44.7	51.9	48.1
Taken formal financial loan (%)			
Yes	45.6	73.1	58.4
No	54.4	26.9	41.6
Loan sources			
NGO	100	100	100
Others	0	0	0
Received advance finance from the middlemen in the supply chain (%)			
Yes	68	66	67
No	32	34	33
Membership of fishing cooperative society (%)			
Yes	6.5	13	9.5
No	93.5	87	90.5
Received government subsidy during fishing ban (%)			
Yes	91.1	17.6	56.7
No	8.9	82.4	43.3
Past history of fishing during ban (%)			
Yes	47.2	62	54.1
No	52.8	38	45.9
Aware of fishing ban in the lake (%)			
Yes	100	96.3	98.3
No	0	3.7	1.7
BFDC licencing			

Yes	34.1	5.6	20.8
No	65.9	94.4	79.2

546

547 **Table 2:** Factors affecting illegal fishing in Kaptai Lake, Bangladesh during the fishery closure
548 period in 2020 (May-July), obtained through multiple logistic regression.

Factors	Estimate	z value	p value
Ban knowledge	-20.37	-0.014	0.989
Fishing society membership	0.86	0.903	0.366
Financial loan	0.47	3.661	<0.001
Government subsidy	-5.36	-7.842	<0.001
Secondary income	-3.49	-4.997	<0.001


549

550 **Table 3:** Pricing of fishes (in Bangladesh Taka, BDT) at various levels of fish distribution
551 from Kaptai Lake, Bangladesh in 2020 along with linear mixed-effect modelling (LMM)
552 results.

Actors	Price (per kg; Mean \pm SD)		Trends (%)	LMM outputs		
	During banned period (May-Jul)	Outside banned period		Estimate	F	p
Fishermen	95.8 \pm 64.9	150.5 \pm 87.0	↓ 36	-0.21	35.4	0.001
<i>Faria</i> (local)	168.8 \pm 83.8	179.2 \pm 100.4	↓ 6	-0.02	0.9	0.390
<i>Faria</i> (national)	209.2 \pm 102.9	207.3 \pm 121.3	↑ 1	0.02	1.0	0.360


553 ~80 BDT = 1USD\$; *farias* are mid-level actors in the distribution channel of fishes. ↓,
554 lowering of price during the fishing banned period than outside banned period;

555



556
557
558


Figure 1: Map of the study area, Kaptai Lake in Bangladesh.



559

560 **Figure 2:** Marketing channels showing distribution of fishes harvested during the ban period
 561 in 2020 in Kaptai Lake, Bangladesh. Coloured straight arrows indicate trends of gross profit
 562 compared to non-ban period. Figure (as %) on the left of the curved arrow shows the
 563 approximate proportion of the total amount of initial harvested. Chattogram was formerly
 564 known as Chittagong.

565



566

567 **Figure 3:** Profit of fishermen (a), mid-level actors who sold their product locally (b) or in
 568 distance cities (c), during and outside the closed season in 2020 in Kaptai Lake, Bangladesh.
 569 Midline within the box is the median; upper and lower limits of the box represent the third and
 570 first quartile (75th and 25th percentile) respectively. Points are outliers.

571

572 **Supplementary information**

573

574 **Form S1: Data collection form for study of illegal fishing motives on Kaptai Lake,**
575 **Bangladesh**

576 [Translated into English, original version was in Bengali]

577 *[The collected data will be used for research purpose only; results will only be presented in a*
578 *summarised / collective form; personal identity of the respondents will not be disclosed]*

Date of interview:

Part A: Basic information

1. Name of the respondent
2. Address:
3. Age of the respondent (in years):
4. Fishing experience in the lake (in years):
5. Education level of the respondent (as schooling years):
6. BFDC fishermen licence holding status: Yes / No
7. Land holding status

Unique ID:
Contact No.

Part B: Knowledge of fishing laws or bans

1. Aware of fishing ban period in the lake: Yes / No
2. Training on fisheries law and regulation:
Details of training if the answer is yes.

Part C: Social, economic and political factors

1. Are you a member of any fishermen cooperative society?
If yes, please provide details.
2. Apart from cooperatives, do you have any other memberships?
If yes, please provide details.
3. Do you have a secondary occupation / income source?
If yes, please mention monthly income.
4. Have you received any training on alternative income generation?
If yes, please provide details.
5. Have you taken financial loan from formal sources? (e.g. bank/NGO)
If yes, please mention loan amount, source and interest rate
6. Have you received finance from informal sources? (e.g. individuals)
If yes, please mention loan amount, source and interest rate
7. Is there any other income generating person in your household?
If yes, please provide details.
8. Are you a registered member of any political party?
If yes, please provide details.

Part D: Subsidy during the fishery closure

1. Have you received subsidy? Yes / No
If yes, was the amount adequate?
If yes, was the distribution timely?
2. What is your expectation regarding subsidy?

Part E: Illegal fishing in the lake (over phone)

1. Have you harvested fish during the fishery closure this year?
If yes, why have you gone for fishing?
If yes, have you motivated by others or self-motivated?
If yes, what did you do with the harvested fishes?
If sold, please mention price, place and other relevant information
 2. What fishing gear have you used for during the fishery closure?
Common characteristics of the gear and its catch composition
 3. Did you fish during the ban in the past?
-

579

580 **Table S1:** Summary of the motives for illegal harvesting (i.e. poaching) of resources, after
 581 Muth and Bowe Jr. (1998).

Motives	Remarks
Commercial gain	Explained and used during the interviews
Household consumption	Explained and used during the interviews
Recreational satisfaction	Explained and used during the interviews
Trophy poaching	Not used
Thrill killing	Not used
Protection of self and property	Not used
Poaching as rebellion	Explained and used during the interviews
Poaching as a tradition of right of use	Explained and used during the interviews
Disagreement with specific regulation	Explained and used during the interviews
Gamesmanship	Explained and used during the interviews

582

583

584 **Table S2:** Component loading of fishermen characteristics (Kaptai Lake, Bangladesh),
 585 obtained through principal component analysis. Boldface indicates the highest component
 586 loading for each factor.

Factors	PC1	PC2
Age	0.94	-0.12
Experience	0.93	-0.17
Education	-0.11	0.99
Variance explained (%)	59	35
Total variance (%)	94	

587

588 **Table S3:** Summary of the subset models explaining fishing status during the fishery closure
 589 period in Kaptai Lake (Bangladesh), yielded from global model. All models with $\Delta AICc$ value
 590 <2 are included here and examined (Table S3). The summary of the final model is presented
 591 in the main text of the paper.

Models	df	logLik	AICc	delta	weight
m1 Ban knowledge+Society membership+ Financial loan+Subsidy+Secondary income	30	-9.7	88.7	0	0.350
m2 Ban knowledge+Financial loan+Subsidy+ Secondary income	29	-11.1	88.9	0.2	0.317
m3 Ban knowledge+Society membership+ Financial loan+ Subsidy+Secondary income+ Other earning member in HH	31	-8.9	89.8	1.1	0.202
m4 Ban knowledge+Age+ Financial loan +Subsidy+ Secondary income	30	-10.7	90.7	1.97	0.131

Final model: *Ban knowledge + Society membership + Financial loan + Subsidy + Secondary income*

592

593

594 **Table S4:** Factors affecting fishing during the fishery closure period in Kaptai Lake
 595 (Bangladesh), based on models in Table S2. Model m1 (not shown) is the final model, based
 596 on model averaging, and already presented in the main manuscript (Table 2).

Model	Factor	Coefficient estimate	SE	z	p	95% CL
m2	Ban knowledge	-20.25	1467.89	-0.01	0.989	NA to 147.30
	Financial loan	0.46	0.13	3.668	<0.001	0.23 to 0.68
	Subsidy	-5.30	0.66	-7.97	<0.001	-6.38 to -4.12
	Secondary income	-3.53	0.70	-5.03	<0.001	-5.04 to -2.25
m3	Ban knowledge	-20.39	1470.60	-0.01	0.989	NA to 147.37
	Society membership	0.86	0.95	0.90	0.367	-1.01 to 2.70
	Financial loan	0.47	0.13	3.63	<0.001	0.23 to 0.69
	Subsidy	-5.38	0.69	-7.79	<0.001	-6.91 to -4.16
	Secondary income	-3.50	0.70	-4.99	<0.001	-5.00 to -2.22
	Other earning member in HH	0.05	0.52	0.09	0.927	-0.93 to 0.91
m4	Ban knowledge	-20.22	1531.70	-0.01	0.989	NA to 153.8
	Age	2.23	2.20	1.02	0.310	-2.08 to 6.63
	Financial loan	0.46	0.13	3.62	<0.001	0.22 to 0.73
	Subsidy	-5.17	0.67	-7.74	<0.001	-6.64 to -3.99
	Secondary income	-3.53	0.70	-5.04	<0.001	-5.03 to -2.25

597

598