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All Outputs (62)

Ideal Default for Resolving Disputes Efficiently (2024)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., & Celik, G. (in press). Ideal Default for Resolving Disputes Efficiently. International Economic Review,

We study arbitration mechanisms where two parties to the dispute have single-peaked preferences over outcomes, represented by concave utility functions. The most preferred outcome of each party is her private information. By participating in an arbit... Read More about Ideal Default for Resolving Disputes Efficiently.

Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games (2023)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Cingiz, K., & Ismail, M. S. (2023). Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 125, 94-100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.002

In this note, we introduce a general model of dynamic
n-player multi-battle Blotto contests in which asymmetric resources and non-homogeneous battlefield prizes are possible. Each player’s probability of winning the prize in a battlefield is govern... Read More about Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games.

“Storm autocracies”: Islands as natural experiments (2022)
Journal Article
Rahman, M. H., Anbarci, N., & Ulubaşoğlu, M. A. (2022). “Storm autocracies”: Islands as natural experiments. Journal of Development Economics, 159, Article 102982. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102982

We exploit the exogenous variation in the timing and intensity of storms in island countries to estimate the storms' effect on the extent of democracy. Using a rich panel dataset spanning the period 1950–2020, our difference-in-differences estimation... Read More about “Storm autocracies”: Islands as natural experiments.

Evolutionary Game Model of Group Choice Dilemmas on Hypergraphs (2021)
Journal Article
Civilini, A., Anbarci, N., & Latora, V. (2021). Evolutionary Game Model of Group Choice Dilemmas on Hypergraphs. Physical Review Letters, 127(26), Article 268301. https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.127.268301

We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the preference... Read More about Evolutionary Game Model of Group Choice Dilemmas on Hypergraphs.

Designing Practical and Fair Sequential Team Contests: The Case of Penalty Shootouts (2021)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Sun, C., & Ünver, M. (2021). Designing Practical and Fair Sequential Team Contests: The Case of Penalty Shootouts. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 25-43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.004

Economists have long recognized that the effect of move order on outcomes is non-negligible in sequential contests. We study tiebreak mechanisms used in team sports and known as penalty shootouts through a dynamic model. We characterize all order-ind... Read More about Designing Practical and Fair Sequential Team Contests: The Case of Penalty Shootouts.

On the Timing of Production Decisions in Monetary Economies (2018)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Dutu, R., & Sun, C. (2019). On the Timing of Production Decisions in Monetary Economies. International Economic Review, 60(1), 447-472. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12359

In most macroeconomic models inflation tends to be harmful. In this paper we show that by simply changing the timing of production decisions by firms from 'on demand' to 'in advance', some inflation can boost welfare as long as goods are sufficiently... Read More about On the Timing of Production Decisions in Monetary Economies.

Payoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of correlated-equilibrium recommendations (2018)
Journal Article
Anbarcı, N., Feltovich, N., & Gürdal, M. (2018). Payoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of correlated-equilibrium recommendations. European Economic Review, 108, 172-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.07.003

We examine theoretically and experimentally how individuals’ willingness to follow third-party recommendations in 2 × 2 games is affected by payoff asymmetry. We consider six versions of Battle-of-the-Sexes. Recommendations imply monetary payoffs tha... Read More about Payoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of correlated-equilibrium recommendations.

Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases (2018)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Rong, K., & Roy, J. (2019). Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases. Economic Theory, 68(1), 21-52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1111-2

We study bilateral bargaining á la Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) but where players face two sources of uncertainty when demands are mutually incompatible. First, there is complete breakdown of negotiations with players receiving zero payoffs,... Read More about Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases.

Revisiting loss aversion: Evidence from professional tennis (2017)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Arin, K., Kuhlenkasper, T., & Zenker, C. (2017). Revisiting loss aversion: Evidence from professional tennis. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 153, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.014

We provide further evidence for the existence of loss aversion in a high-stakes context: professional tennis. Our contribution to the literature is threefold: (1) We provide a theoretical framework as a basis of our investigation, (2) we test the pre... Read More about Revisiting loss aversion: Evidence from professional tennis.

How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm (2017)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., & Feltovich, N. (2018). How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 145, 320-334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.020

A recurring puzzle in bargaining experiments is that individuals under-exploit their bargaining position, compared to theoretical predictions. We conduct an experiment using two institutions: Nash demand game (NDG) and unstructured bargaining game (U... Read More about How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm.

Evolutionary stability of bargaining and price posting: implications for formal and informal activities (2017)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Gomis-Porqueras, P., & Pivato, M. (2017). Evolutionary stability of bargaining and price posting: implications for formal and informal activities. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 28(2), 365-397. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-017-0544-2

In this paper we study the co-existence of two well known trading protocols, bargaining and price-posting. To do so we consider a frictional environment where buyers and sellers play price-posting and bargaining games infinitely many times. Sellers s... Read More about Evolutionary stability of bargaining and price posting: implications for formal and informal activities.

Information control in reputational cheap talk (2017)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Ghosh, S., & Roy, J. (2017). Information control in reputational cheap talk. Games and Economic Behavior, 106, 153-160. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.010

An evaluator estimates as precisely as possible the innate talent of a careerist expert by observing the expert's performance in a prediction task, and has the ability to interfere with the expert's private signal by affecting its precision. The expe... Read More about Information control in reputational cheap talk.

Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders (2017)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., & Roy, J. (2017). Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders. Theory and Decision, 84(1), 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7

Do hard budget constraints work in favour or against truth telling in double auctions? McAfee (1992) constructed a simple double auction mechanism (MDA), which is strategyproof and minimally inefficient, but may resort to dual prices, where the diffe... Read More about Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders.

Can extreme rainfall trigger democratic change? The role of flood-induced corruption (2017)
Journal Article
Rahman, M., Anbarci, N., Bhattacharya, P., & Ulubaşoğlu, M. (2017). Can extreme rainfall trigger democratic change? The role of flood-induced corruption. Public Choice, 171(3-4), 331-358. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0440-1

Using a new dataset of extreme rainfall covering 130 countries from 1979 to 2009, this paper investigates whether and how extreme rainfall-driven flooding affects democratic conditions. Our key finding indicates that extreme rainfall-induced flooding... Read More about Can extreme rainfall trigger democratic change? The role of flood-induced corruption.

Pricing in Competitive Search Markets: The Roles of Price Information and Fairness Perceptions (2017)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., & Feltovich, N. (2017). Pricing in Competitive Search Markets: The Roles of Price Information and Fairness Perceptions. Management Science, 64(3), 1101-1120. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2620

We use a competitive search (price-posting) framework to experimentally examine how buyer information and fairness perceptions affect market behavior. We observe that moving from zero to one uninformed buyers leads to higher prices in both 2 (seller)... Read More about Pricing in Competitive Search Markets: The Roles of Price Information and Fairness Perceptions.

Is Roger Federer more loss averse than Serena Williams? (2016)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Arin, K., Okten, C., & Zenker, C. (2016). Is Roger Federer more loss averse than Serena Williams?. Applied Economics, 49(35), 3546-3559. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2016.1262527

Using data from the high-stakes 2013 Dubai professional tennis tournament, we find that, compared with a tied score, (i) male players have a higher serve speed and thus exhibit more effort when behind in score, and their serve speeds get less sensiti... Read More about Is Roger Federer more loss averse than Serena Williams?.

The Shocking Origins of Political Transitions: Evidence from Earthquakes (2016)
Journal Article
Habibur Rahman, M., Anbarci, N., Bhattacharya, P., & Ulubaşoğlu, M. (2017). The Shocking Origins of Political Transitions: Evidence from Earthquakes. Southern Economic Journal, 83(3), 796-823. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12180

Do earthquakes trigger political transitions? Using a rich panel dataset of 160 countries observed over 1950–2007, we find that earthquake shocks, measured in terms of the effect of ground‐motion amplitude on death toll, have two contradicting effect... Read More about The Shocking Origins of Political Transitions: Evidence from Earthquakes.

A New Industry Concentration Index (2015)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., & Katzman, B. (2015). A New Industry Concentration Index. Economic Papers, 34(4), 222-228. https://doi.org/10.1111/1759-3441.12122

We propose and analyse a new concentration index alternative to the Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index (HHI). This new index emphasises the concept of competitive balance. It is designed to preserve the convexity property of the HHI when a merger involves on... Read More about A New Industry Concentration Index.

Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation (2015)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Dutu, R., & Feltovich, N. (2015). Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 61, 17-33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2015.09.005

In this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting. To do so, we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations. The model, which provide... Read More about Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation.