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All Outputs (32)

Teleology (2024)
Book
Tugby, M. (2024). Teleology. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009257404

Teleology is about functions, ends, and goals in nature. This Element offers a philosophical examination of these phenomena and aims to reinstate teleology as a core part of the metaphysics of science. It starts with a critical analysis of three theo... Read More about Teleology.

The property of goal‐directedness: Lessons from the dispositions debate (2024)
Journal Article
Tugby, M. (online). The property of goal‐directedness: Lessons from the dispositions debate. Ratio: An international journal of analytic philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12417

The system‐property or ‘cybernetic’ theory of goals and goal‐directedness became popular in the twentieth century. It is a theory that has reductionist and behaviourist roots. There are reasons to think that the system‐property theory needs to be for... Read More about The property of goal‐directedness: Lessons from the dispositions debate.

Collective Powers (2023)
Book Chapter
Guo, X., & Tugby, M. (2023). Collective Powers. In C. J. Austin, A. Marmodoro, & A. Roselli (Eds.), Powers, Parts and Wholes: Essays on the Mereology of Powers (142-166). New York and Abingdon: Oxon: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003298830-11

It is natural to think there are higher-level powers, such as a screen’s powers to display various images, and lower-level powers such as each pixel’s powers to display various colours. Moreover, it is natural to think that higher-level powers depend... Read More about Collective Powers.

Dispositional realism without dispositional essences (2022)
Journal Article
Tugby, M. (2022). Dispositional realism without dispositional essences. Synthese, 200(3), Article 222. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03554-9

Dispositional realism, as we shall use the term, is a non-reductive, anti-Humean approach to dispositions which says that natural properties confer certain dispositions as a matter of metaphysical necessity. A strong form of dispositional realism is... Read More about Dispositional realism without dispositional essences.

A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes (2021)
Book Chapter
Alvarado, J. T., & Tugby, M. (2021). A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes. In L. Jansen, & P. Sandstad (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian perspectives on formal causation (201-221). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429329821

A combination of formal causation and natural-kind essentialism has good prospects. After all, natural-kind essentialists are under pressure to accept that natural kinds ground or formally cause the properties that characterize them. However, natural... Read More about A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes.

Atoms as Universals (2020)
Book Chapter
Tugby, M. (2020). Atoms as Universals. In U. Zilioli (Ed.), Atomism in philosophy: A history from antiquity to the present (387-399). Bloomsbury Academic

This chapter explores how atomism – the view that there are fundamental indivisible objects – can be combined with a realist ontology of universals. We propose and develop a new theory that views an atom as an instance of a simple universal (such as... Read More about Atoms as Universals.

Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties (2020)
Journal Article
Tugby, M. (2021). Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties. Grazer philosophische Studien, 98(1), 123-145. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000112

Traditionally, many arguments for realism about properties (universals or tropes) rely on a priori claims. The author argues that if we make use of an abductive principle that is commonly employed by scientific realists, a new argument for property r... Read More about Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties.

Potentiality: actualism minus naturalism equals platonism (2020)
Journal Article
Giannini, G., & Tugby, M. (2020). Potentiality: actualism minus naturalism equals platonism. Philosophical inquiries, 8(1), 117-140. https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v8i1.278

Vetter (2015) develops a localised theory of modality, based on potentialities of actual objects. Two factors play a key role in its appeal: its commitment to Hardcore Actualism, and to Naturalism. Vetter’s commitment to Naturalism is in part manifes... Read More about Potentiality: actualism minus naturalism equals platonism.

Dialogue on Rhythm: Entrainment and the Dynamic Thesis (2019)
Book Chapter
Hamilton, A., Macarthur, D., Squires, R., Tugby, M., & Wiseman, R. (2019). Dialogue on Rhythm: Entrainment and the Dynamic Thesis. In P. Cheyne, A. Hamilton, & M. Paddison (Eds.), The philosophy of rhythm : aesthetics, music, poetics (15-42). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199347773.003.0002

The advantages of the dialogue form—in particular, the advantage of openness—have been neglected in post-eighteenth-century philosophy. Unlike the currently dominant journal article form, the present dialogue neither arrives at, nor seeks to impose,... Read More about Dialogue on Rhythm: Entrainment and the Dynamic Thesis.

Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation (2017)
Journal Article
Tugby, M. (2017). Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation. American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(3), 269-281

Is it metaphysically possible for a world to contain power properties but no nonpower properties? Recently, much progress has been made by powers theorists to defend the coherence of such a possibility. But unfortunately, it remains unclear how the p... Read More about Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation.

Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity (2017)
Journal Article
Tugby, M. (2018). Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity. Erkenntnis, 83(3), 465-476. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9898-y

The Platonic account of modality says, roughly, that truths about alien possibilities are grounded in uninstantiated universals. Recently, Ingram has raised a problem for this kind of view, which is that it apparently requires negative facts to play... Read More about Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity.

On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions (2016)
Journal Article
Tugby, M. (2016). On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions. Philosophia, 44(2), 623-631. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9713-z

Recently, Choi (Noûs, 46, 289–325, 2012) has argued that current accounts of intrinsically finkable dispositions lead to absurd consequences in certain everyday cases. In this paper I offer a new argument for the existence of intrinsically finkable d... Read More about On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions.