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All Outputs (26)

Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory (2023)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2023). Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory. Journal of Philosophy, 120(9), 457-483. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2023120927

Moral error theory has many troubling and counterintuitive consequences. It entails, for example, that actions we ordinarily think of as obviously wrong are not wrong at all. This simple observation is at the heart of much opposition to error theory.... Read More about Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory.

Confidence of Life Detection: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (2023)
Journal Article
Vickers, P., Cowie, C., Dick, S. J., Gillen, C., Jeancolas, C., Rothschild, L. J., & McMahon, S. (2023). Confidence of Life Detection: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Astrobiology, https://doi.org/10.1089/ast.2022.0084

Potential biosignatures offering the promise of extraterrestrial life (past or present) are to be expected in the coming years and decades, whether from within our own solar system, from an exoplanet atmosphere, or otherwise. With each such potential... Read More about Confidence of Life Detection: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.

What are Paradoxes? (2022)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2023). What are Paradoxes?. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 9(1), 154-171. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.48

According to a standard view, paradoxes are arguments with plausible premises that entail an implausible conclusion. This is false. In many paradoxes the premises are not plausible precisely because they entail an implausible conclusion. Obvious resp... Read More about What are Paradoxes?.

Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence (2022)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2023). Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence. Philosophical Quarterly, 73(1), 64-83. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac009

Avi Loeb has defended the hypothesis that the interstellar object, ‘Oumuamua, detected in 2017, is in fact an extraterrestrial artefact. His hypothesis has been widely rejected by the scientific community. On examination however it is not clear why.... Read More about Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence.

Introduction (2019)
Book Chapter
Cowie, C., & Rowland, R. (2020). Introduction. In Companions in guilt : arguments in metaethics (1-16). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429454677-1

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book aims to distinguish between two kinds of companions in guilt strategy: by analogy, and by entailment. It explores the methodology o... Read More about Introduction.

Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox? (2019)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2020). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies, 177(6), 1685-1702. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6

In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to kn... Read More about Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?.

The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics (2018)
Book Chapter
Cowie, C. (2018). The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics. In J. Suikkanen, & A. Kauppinen (Eds.), Methodology and moral philosophy (127-147). Routledge

Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity (2018)
Book Chapter
Cowie, C., & Greenberg, A. (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In C. Kyriacou, & R. McKenna (Eds.), Metaepistemology : realism and anti-realism (173-196). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8

According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth.... Read More about Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity.

Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing (2017)
Journal Article
Schleicher, J., Schaafsma, M., Burgess, N. D., Sandbrook, C., Danks, F., Cowie, C., & Vira, B. (2018). Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing. Sustainable Development, 26(1), 83-98. https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.1692

The relationship between sustainable development’s prime goal, human wellbeing, and the natural environment has been narrowly conceived. This paper focuses on the possibility and the implications of treating the natural environment as a ‘constituent’... Read More about Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing.

Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force? (2016)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies, 174(12), 3021-3039. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0844-7

In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use... Read More about Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?.

Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh (2016)
Journal Article
Greenberg, A., & Cowie, C. (2017). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1), 128 - 145. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12158

We respond to Conor McHugh's claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a more general sceptical conclu... Read More about Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh.